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donors at the triple nexus: lessons from Sweden

report

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Executive summary

The need to connect humanitarian, development and peace approaches has long been understood. Without these connections, the incidences and impacts of crises cannot be sustainably reduced and many people in high-risk contexts will be 'left behind' in extreme poverty and vulnerability. Building connections has gained renewed recognition and momentum as a policy and practice agenda in recent years and become formalised as a priority for donors in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) recommendation on the humanitarian-development-peace 'triple nexus' in early 2019.

Sweden is among the donors which have been actively engaged both in global discussions on developing the triple nexus and in internal initiatives to put it into practice. Like other donors, implementation remains a work in progress – it is too soon after the OECD DAC recommendation to measure progress against it, but there is a clear level of commitment and momentum shown in the change. Sweden takes both a principled and pragmatic approach to implementation, preserving impartial humanitarian assistance while building connections to it. At a programme level, it is implementing a range of context-specific approaches; at the headquarters level, it is currently looking at ways to support systematic ways of working. From experience to date, five areas of learning emerge:

Top-level policy sets solid foundations – now operational guidance needs to be built

Sweden's current approach to the nexus comes from many years of making connections, most notably informed by its early adoption of resilience approaches. Top-level policy and strategies set a strong steer for Swedish official development assistance (ODA) to work in a concerted and connected way to reduce risk, vulnerability and crisis. Although they pre-date the DAC triple nexus recommendation, they do set the stage for realising it. They demarcate the respective roles of humanitarian, development and peace support and demand a close interplay between them but leave much latitude for application.

This latitude is largely positive, giving space to evolve context-relevant approaches, but it can also generate uncertainty and confusion: policy frameworks do not provide clear expectations on where, when and how to make connections. This is a gap that can be filled in two ways – through new guidelines and tools, and in operational plans. Sweden's current array of guidelines and tools do not cover putting the nexus into practice – staff are currently working to fill this 'missing middle' of the operational toolkit. Nonetheless, many regional, country and thematic strategies and plans are increasingly reflecting analysis of acute and underlying vulnerabilities and risks incorporating priorities to

address them. The challenge now is to embed this as a routine consideration in all operational strategic planning, rather than a team-dependent consideration in some.

Shared analysis is undertaken, now needs to become synchronised and default

As the OECD DAC recommendation notes, shared analysis is the necessary foundation for joined-up action. Although Sweden maintains a principled separate analysis of humanitarian and development risks and needs, there is scope within both processes to include a comprehensive analysis of situations and build a shared understanding. The annual humanitarian analysis includes sections on root causes and longer-term development needs and is the focus of joint discussions at global and country levels. Sweden's country and regional development analyses follow a multi-dimensional poverty model, with its focus on 'human security'. This provides a strong basis for joint analysis, although there is still room for a stronger emphasis on risk and resilience and to incorporate learning from Sweden's experience of piloting resilience systems analysis. Frequency and synchronicity are also issues: the development analyses and strategies are usually on a four-year cycle, while the humanitarian versions are annual. This has not stood in the way of some country teams adapting their approaches as situations change, but annual opportunities could be standardised for recalibrating plans to changing risks and needs.

Practice is ahead of policy – it now needs to be shared and understood

For many donors and agencies, the nexus tends to make more sense in practice than on paper, and this certainly seems to be true for Sweden. While its guidelines are still evolving, it has developed a growing and diverse portfolio of practical experience in working at the nexus, rightly developed according to the situation and opportunities in specific contexts, rather than by a top-down blueprint. While there is a strong imperative and some examples of a transitional or sequential model which hands over from humanitarian to development, particularly in rapid-onset disasters, simultaneous approaches are more common, where humanitarian and development investments work side by side. It is an important juncture now to document and learn from these currently disparate examples. A recently formed nexus working group is seeking to more routinely track them, recognising the need to share experience and generate evidence of 'what works' to reduce risks, needs and vulnerabilities and help ensure that no one is left behind in crisis-affected and crisis-prone contexts.

Partners have flexible support – they now need to co-develop explicit expectations

As a donor, Sweden aims to be as flexible as possible, allowing significant scope to work at the nexus, despite the clear demarcation of humanitarian and development assistance. There are specific funds to facilitate work at the nexus but these are felt to be less essential than Sweden's inbuilt models of flexible and decentralised funding, which have

been used in many settings to direct development assistance to build resilience and address long-term impacts of crises.

Sweden is actively engaging with its multilateral and non-governmental organisation (NGO) partners at country and global levels to make connections at the nexus. So far, explicit expectations and dialogue are being led by the Humanitarian Unit with their NGO partners – other partner engagement remains more ad hoc. At present, there are no overall obligations or specific requirements for partners to consider work at the nexus, nor indeed clarity as to what partners should expect from Sweden as a donor in this regard. Making this explicit could counteract the pressures towards risk aversion in development action, as well as support accountability and shared learning. Sweden's flexible funding, core support and new thinking around adaptive programming could provide the building blocks for developing a risk-embracing outcome-based model as part of programme partnerships.

Like many other donors, a very small proportion of Swedish ODA is channelled via the state in fragile or crisis-affected countries. While this circumvents the difficulties in working with governments to address crisis, risk and resilience in governance-constrained environments, it also reduces the scope to provide technical assistance or incentivise fundamental change. This makes working effectively with other donors and with multilateral agencies all the more important.

Leadership and investment in expertise is clear – know-how and communication also need to be mainstreamed

As a medium-sized donor, the organisational structure for governing ODA expenditure in Sweden is not overly complicated. The division of responsibilities between different headquarters' thematic and geographic teams in the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs do not present insurmountable obstacles to a joined-up approach, but they do require efforts to be made to foster regular communication and routine co-working. The recent creation of a nexus working group within Sida should help to consolidate and develop cross-departmental thinking and action and improve inclusion of the peace leg.

The senior leadership team at Sida – all departmental directors – have communicated a clear steer that working at the nexus is an agency-wide expectation and priority. This supports the shift of the previously perceived centre of nexus gravity from the Humanitarian Unit. Strong country-level leadership remains crucial to enable effective nexus programming, and to creatively deploy the full range of 'Team Sweden's' toolkit, including funding allocations, system support and political engagement.

The recent recruitment of a new cadre of nexus-focused in-country staff is an important investment in skills and capacity to lead humanitarian-development-peace programme connections. These staff members will help often overstretched teams to identify, create and develop opportunities. At the same, in parallel and in the long-term, skills, knowledge and capacity need to be mainstreamed in all teams and performance management could make it explicit that staff should be working in a connected way.

1. Introduction

Working at the 'nexus' between emergency response and longer-term approaches is necessary to reduce the need, vulnerabilities and risks faced by crisis-affected people, supporting resilient livelihoods and ensuring that people are not 'left behind' or trapped in poverty. This has been long understood and is reflected in the commitments of the Sustainable Development Goals to "leave no one behind", but has gained renewed focus as a policy agenda since the 2016 Agenda for Humanity called for humanitarian and development actors to work together to achieve 'collective outcomes' for people. This was followed by the creation of a United Nations Joint Steering Committee to pilot a "New Way of Working": collaborative, multi-year approaches drawing on the comparative strengths of multiple actors. Building on this, in February 2019, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) published its recommendation on the 'humanitarian-development-peace nexus'.[1] This provides a clear set of working principles for DAC members and a common reference point for all relevant organisations. It defines the 'nexus' as the "interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions" and the 'nexus approach' as the "aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity, capitalising on the comparative advantages of each pillar" (Box 1).

Financing is crucial to realising these commitments – not just to provide funding for interventions, but to enable and incentivise new ways of working collaboratively and coherently. Bilateral government donors clearly have an important role to play in supporting, shaping and catalysing system-wide and context-specific coordination and action. However, for many donors, funding and financing approaches to the nexus are still in the process of catching up with the policy agenda, and there is a need to share learning and develop best practice both in-house and collectively. All donors face similar 'nexus' questions: how to balance systematic top-down approaches with the latitude for tailored in-country initiatives; what scale of ambition to aim for in the spectrum from complementarity to coherence; how to focus on both internal change and system transformation? And ultimately, they all face the same central question: what works?

This paper is part of a series which aims to document and share current donor practice at the nexus, with a view to informing practical global dialogue on these questions and more.

This study focuses on Sweden as significant contributor of official development assistance (ODA). At the latest count, it was the eighth largest government donor of ODA and the sixth largest of humanitarian assistance. As an equivalent proportion of gross national income (GNI), it ranks much higher: 1.1% and 0.17%, respectively. A recent OECD DAC peer review of Sweden's performance as an ODA donor was highly positive, finding it overall to be an "adept, ambitious and influential actor on global sustainable

development" and an "effective and principled" humanitarian donor.[2] In terms of wider coherence of government policy with ODA objectives, Sweden generally ranks high.[3]

Sweden recognises the importance of addressing fragility and risk for global security and in order to "leave no one behind" and meet the needs of the furthest behind. It has therefore increased both its ODA allocation to peacebuilding and the overall proportion of its ODA spent in fragile contexts. In 2017, it directed US$1.36 billion to fragile states, equivalent to 0.25% of its GNI, making it the sixth largest DAC donor to fragile states.[4] This study looks at three dimensions of how Sweden translates these investments into meaningful support for action at the triple nexus. It focuses on three pillars that support this: policy and strategy, allocation and programme cycles and organisational systems.

Like many other donors, Sweden is at an important juncture in implementing its nexus commitments. This report has highlighted the many initiatives and programme examples that Sweden and its partners have implemented. Even within the period of research and writing, new changes and ideas are underway. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs must now continue to work concertedly, both internally (between agencies and departments) and externally (with implementing and collaborating partners), to co-develop a clear and shared understanding of what the triple nexus means for Sweden as a donor and how this works in practice. This report identifies planned next steps as well as a series of further suggestions, which although grounded in the Swedish experience, may also be relevant for other donors facing similar challenges.

This report is part of a series of studies intended to share emerging lessons and approaches as donors evolve their practical application of their nexus commitments. Research on the UK's approach will be published in a parallel study, and lessons and questions from both studies will be published in a synthesis report. Our intention is that these materials will inform dialogue and developments within and between donors, as it is clear that making the necessary policy and practice shifts must be a highly considered and commonly concerted effort. It might be too early to measure performance against the DAC recommendation, but it is never too soon to share learning.

Box 1: A note on terminology

This paper uses 'nexus' as a short-hand term to refer to the connections between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches. It aligns with the definition in the OECD DAC recommendation:

- *'Nexus' refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actions.*
- *'Nexus approach' refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalise on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the*

number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.

We are clear that working 'at the nexus' to make these connections is not an end in itself, but a means to ultimately addressing and reducing "people's unmet needs, risks and vulnerabilities, increasing their resilience and addressing the root causes of conflict".

In referring to resilience, we align with the OECD DAC definition, on which Sida also closely bases its definition[5], as:

The ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, while positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty. Resilience is about addressing the root causes of crises while strengthening the capacities and resources of a system in order to cope with risks, stresses and shocks.[6]

2. Policy, strategy and nexus engagement

2.1 Policy and strategy framework

Lessons: Top-level policy and strategies set a strong steer for Swedish official development assistance (ODA) to work in a concerted and connected way in order to reduce risk, vulnerability and crisis and ensure no one is left behind. Although they pre-date the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) 'triple nexus' recommendation, they clearly set the stage for realising it: they all call for greater coherence and connections between humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and political dialogue in crisis contexts. They demarcate the respective roles of humanitarian, development and peace support and demand a close interplay between them. As a broad set of directions and requirements, they leave much latitude for application.

Overarching frameworks

The Swedish government's vision and strategy for its ODA is summarised in its Policy Framework. This provides the top-level guiding principles and parameters for regional, country and thematic strategies and operational plans, including for peace and humanitarian assistance (Appendix 5).

The current Policy Framework[7] was updated from 2013's iteration to reflect Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement and to explicitly link poverty reduction to economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. It states the aim of Swedish development cooperation as creating "preconditions for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression".

Although the Framework pre-dates recent global commitments to the nexus, it is clearly in line with these and sets strong foundations to support their implementation. It explicitly recognises the interplay between multiple risks and causes of vulnerability, noting the role of development in "increasing the resilience of societies and opportunities of people, and thus reducing the risk of humanitarian crises and preventing protracted crises". It also provides a clear call for long-term solutions to recurring and protracted crises and an increase in "development actors working to strengthen the resilience of individuals and societies and operating in humanitarian contexts". It commits to "putting more effort into conflict resolution, disaster risk reduction, education, sustainable use of natural resources, environmental and climate work and long-term development […] to ensure that crises do not arise and are not protracted or recurrent". It also demands increased development presence in fragile and crisis-affected contexts and improvements in joint

analysis, planning and goal formulation by humanitarian and development actors, working in parallel rather than just in sequence and guided by a clear division of labour that respects humanitarian principles.

Peaceful and inclusive societies are explicitly recognised as a pre-requisite for sustainable development and conflict as a threat to poverty reduction: there can be "no peace without sustainable development and no sustainable development without peace, and neither without respect for human rights".[8]. So, in line with – but ahead of – the triple nexus of the OECD DAC recommendation, conflict was given a new prominence in this latest version of the Policy Framework. It has been elevated alongside gender and environment as a dimension which must be considered in all Swedish development programming.[9,10]

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has recently finalised an overarching three-year Operational Plan (2019–2021),[11] which articulates the vision and mission for the agency, connecting the steer in the Policy Framework to a set of operational objectives and a common action plan for the agency. Taking the principle of 'leaving no one behind' as its starting point, it clearly restates the case for effective coordination at the nexus, setting out a clear objective for the period: for Sida to have "developed methods, ways of working and routines that enable an effective interplay between humanitarian assistance and long-term development, including peacebuilding contributions".

Humanitarian strategy

Sweden's latest four-year humanitarian strategy (2017–2020)[12] is one of a set of 'thematic strategies' that add detail to the Policy Framework. Reiterating the rationale for an integrated approach to reduce and address the risk and impacts of crises, it reflects the Policy Framework's commitment to closer interaction and a holistic approach to development cooperation, while continuing to clearly respect humanitarian principles. This demands clearly demarcated work and approaches that ensure that Sweden's humanitarian assistance is allocated and prioritised according to severity of needs – but it also necessitates joint thinking and dialogue to develop the best solutions.

It commits to strengthening cooperation with development actors to "improve the conditions for resilience and risk reduction" and – on condition of respect for humanitarian principles – support increased synergies between humanitarian response plans and UN and national governments' development plans. Conflict sensitivity is also built into the humanitarian approach, both as a basic 'do no harm' consideration in analysis and in planning and programming, and also, where appropriate, in humanitarian activities which prevent conflict and promote peace. It notes that, wherever possible, resilience should also be mainstreamed in humanitarian approaches, to strengthen the capacities of people and societies to deal with crises and to support sustainable solutions.

Peace strategy

Sweden's current five-year Strategy for Sustainable Peace[13] runs from 2017–2022, and covers both funding channelled through Sida and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.[14] It is a short, top-line statement of intent to guide the annual allocation of the peace budget.[15] It sets out the overarching objectives: contributing to preventing armed conflict; conflict resolution; sustainable peacebuilding and state-building; increasing human security in fragile and conflict-affected states and empowering excluded groups in these situations. It seeks to support capacity to do this at the global level and at the national and local levels. Its focus on forgotten and protracted conflicts includes strengthened opportunities for peace dividends.[16] An accompanying explanatory tool clarifies the difference between working *in* conflict (involving risk awareness and conflict sensitivity) and working *on* conflict (involving active engagement to promote peace and security).[17]

In accordance with the Policy Framework, the peace strategy also sets a clear intent to work at the nexus. It acknowledges the need for a "close interplay between humanitarian assistance, long-term development cooperation, political dialogue and mediation, as well as coordinated and complementary measures at national, regional and global level" and states that "activities shall contribute to increased collaboration between actors in the humanitarian system and long-term development cooperation with a focus on joint analysis, planning and goal formulation", calling for an adaptive and iterative approach to implementation.

2.2 Policy progress and engagement on the nexus

Lessons: Sweden's current approach to the nexus comes from many years of making connections, most notably its early adoption of resilience approaches. There has been recent and ongoing momentum in internal reflection and external engagement on policies and practice. The challenge now is drawing these sometimes-disparate initiatives from specific teams into a commonly owned and understood set of positions and learning.

The language and commitments in the framing policies and strategies are grounded in many years of thought and action. Sweden has long made the connections between humanitarian and longer-term development assistance, and between addressing the root causes, acute symptoms and long-term consequences of crises. Like many other donors and agencies, this has taken different forms and approaches. Overall, the picture that emerges is of a donor which has actively and thoughtfully committed to promoting and holding itself to account on these connections, but which is continuing to learn how to do so systematically and comprehensively. Evidently, as with many donors and agencies, conceptualisation of the nexus has very much focused on connections between humanitarian action and development assistance – the double nexus. The so-called triple nexus – bringing peace into the equation – appears to be at a much earlier conceptual stage, although there are some longstanding examples of putting it into practice in programming.[18]

Sweden was an early and active adopter of resilience[19] approaches in countries where humanitarian needs, conflict and chronic poverty go hand-in-hand – and these have informed and provided a departure point for much of its current 'nexus' thinking. As far back as 2012, resilience was an explicit objective in Sida's Operational Plan. It was the subject of a specific evaluation[20] which among its recommendations called for more explicit risk and resilience emphasis in theories of change and results frameworks and encouraging wider ownership beyond humanitarian. By 2015, resilience and the complementarity between humanitarian and development approaches had become a key priority[21] when Sida began a two-year project with the OECD DAC to develop and pilot its resilience systems analysis approach in seven countries.[22]

Now, as Sida develops its nexus approach, there is a recognised need to ensure that lessons from the successes and challenges of applying a resilience approach are fully learned. Sida also has to clarify and support a common understanding among staff of the overlap and differences between the two terms: both 'resilience' and 'nexus' are rather broad and abstract terms, and while some staff members are clear on what they mean, others tend to use the terms interchangeably. This is not exclusive to Sweden – the same is true in many donors and agencies – but it matters if they are to make the most of resilience learning to date and to avoid the nexus being dismissed as just a repackaging.

Box 2: Sweden's definition of resilience

Resilience is a concept which runs through Sweden's official development assistance policies and strategies. It is seen as a "unifying concept where all aspects of development cooperation (including environment and climate and peace and state-building) meet and where humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation serve a common purpose."[23]

The working definition is closely aligned with the OECD DAC definition (Chapter 1, Box 1). It defines resilience as the "ability of people and communities to cope with, recover, adapt and change when exposed to crises and/or disasters" and therefore sees resilience as three types of "capacity that Sida/Sweden and others can contribute to strengthen": absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity and transformative capacity.[24]

Resilience analysis also provides a useful typology of risks, shocks and stresses:[25]

- Covariate shocks: which affect a wide group of people
- Idiosyncratic shocks: which specifically affect individuals or households
- Seasonal or recurring shocks: which periodically affect people
- Stresses: long-term trends which deplete coping capacity and increase vulnerability.

Beyond resilience, a series of evaluations have charted progress on wider humanitarian-development connections. In 2016, an evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance found that it had been actively promoting synergies, despite a lack of formal incentives to do so, or of structures for collaboration. This was a result of a growing recognition of importance of joint analysis, of flexible funding, of resilience approaches, and of staff identifying and seizing opportunities.[26]

In 2017, Sida undertook an internal evaluation on the "interaction between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation"[27] as a midpoint review of progress to operationalise its vision for a "functional interaction" between its humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. This broadly found that staff were clear on and supportive of this as a priority concept, but that they were less confident about what this meant in practice (the 'who, what, where and how') and, to some extent, what the rationale was (the 'why').

This was followed by a 2019 evaluation by Sweden's National Audit Office, published in 2019,[28] which also scrutinised the relationship between Sida's humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation. For the period between 2015 and 2017, it examined whether the government had created an enabling environment for collaboration and whether Sida had designed the right working methods. Like the internal evaluation, it revealed a mixed picture of progress. It also included the clear reminder that the nexus is not a goal in itself but a means to achieving the overall goals of Swedish ODA.

Alongside this internal reflection, externally, Sweden was actively engaged with the OECD DAC discussions that led to the November 2018 recommendation on the nexus and continues to engage in long-term dialogue with the DAC team. Sweden has used the DAC process as a springboard for internal discussions within and between its departments, and externally with its partners.

2.3 Translation of policy into operational strategy

Lessons: Overarching framework commitments on the nexus are translated into operational strategies at the level of country-specific strategies and humanitarian plans. Their content and processes are increasingly reflecting and incorporating the nexus, though inconsistencies remain. To support translating top-line concepts into concrete strategy, Sweden also has a range of guidance documents, tools and notes, but these do not yet provide clear guidance on how to put the nexus into practice – staff are currently considering how to fill this 'missing middle' of operational guidance on the nexus.

Country and regional strategies

Country strategies set the operational plans for Sweden's ODA allocations in a specific country or regional programme. As of 2019, there were 25 country strategies and six multi-country or regional strategies. These are usually revised every four years, prepared by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the basis of analysis from Sida. They are based on a series of inputs, including a multidimensional poverty analysis (Section 3.1)

and drawn up in collaboration between staff based in the geographic departments in Stockholm and those in-country in the embassies. The ‘new generation’ of country strategies are addressing the nexus more prominently and joint working to develop them is proving important to connect staff, as well as programmes, strengthening interdepartmental relationships and establishing programmatic connections. This is a work in progress: as the recent peer review by the OECD DAC noted, it is not yet systematised in the strategies for all the countries which have been in long-term receipt of humanitarian assistance, primarily because these are at different stages in their four-year cycles (Appendix 6), but also partly because it had been contingent on country leadership and staff capacity.[29]

In the countries where the connections are being made, they are formulated in a way that strengthens coherence and complementarity with humanitarian assistance and they have a stronger focus on resilience that brings peacebuilding, development as well as humanitarian together. Several strategies – including those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan – also include peace (articulated as ‘building peace’, ‘peaceful societies’, ‘durable peace’ or ‘human security’) as a specific strategy area or objective. As explored in the next section, strategies based on good multidimensional analysis create possibilities for interconnected, multisectoral strategic programming: for example, under the Sudan strategy, natural resource management programmes integrate peacebuilding, as do food and agriculture programmes in the DRC strategy.

The fixed four-year cycle for the country strategies is both an opportunity to set out a medium-to-long term approach to risks and vulnerabilities and a challenge to adapting to volatile situations in fragile and crisis-affected contexts. This challenge could be addressed by a systematically risk-informed analysis at the outset, combined with current opportunities to recalibrate, including at the midpoint review. This would exploit flexibility in development plans and maintain the room to adapt to serious changes throughout the strategy period. In Somalia, for example, analysis of the internally displaced persons crisis ultimately informed the process of developing the new country development strategy for 2018–2022, which now highlights internally displaced persons under each sectoral results area, providing both the clear direction and necessary flexibility to address their development needs.

There are several points in the process that could be better used for this recalibration. The annual humanitarian country analysis process includes consultation with the country teams – routine consideration of its findings against the development strategy could ensure that opportunities are taken to make connections between poverty reduction, peacebuilding and crisis prevention and response. Each country team also develops annual implementation plans for their strategies, offering important opportunities for recalibration to external events and making closer connections with the annual humanitarian country analysis.

Box 3: Adapting development strategies in the face of new crises

The Bangladesh country strategy shows how, in extreme cases, country strategies can adapt to respond to new crises. Agreed in 2014, the original strategy could not foresee the Rohingya refugee crisis. As the situation escalated in 2017, the Country Director first used his delegated authority to recalibrate the focus of existing projects and then, in 2018, with the injection of US$30 million additional development funding, added a new objective to the country strategy: to build resilience for the refugees and host communities in Cox's Bazar.

Elsewhere, at a slower adaptation pace, regional strategies have been developed to respond to recurrent and chronic crises. In 2018, a new regional resilience initiative was developed, aimed at preventing recurrent humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa.

Humanitarian plans

Humanitarian plans are deliberately shorter-term and separate from the country strategies. Building on a distinct analysis methodology, the humanitarian 'strategies' for each country – in the form of 'humanitarian crisis analyses'– are drawn up annually to reflect and adapt to changing needs. These involve a separate process to ensure that they respect humanitarian principles: that they are guided by an assessment of where the greatest needs are and ensure independence from the political considerations that are an inevitable part of development cooperation.

In 2019, five out of the 15 countries targeted for large-scale Swedish humanitarian assistance at the start of the year did not have a country strategy for development assistance. This can be a major challenge to making connections between humanitarian and development work, but as seen in Chapter 3, Box 6, not an insurmountable one: in the case of Yemen, making the connections with supporting peace dividends programming was still possible. Regional strategies also play an important role where there are no country development strategies to connect with: increased investment in a regional strategy for the Sahel has enabled connections to be made to improve human security in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria (Box 4).

While humanitarian plans are clearly not driven by, integrated into or yet routinely considered in development strategies, they do actively seek complementarity and engage development staff in their processes. For the past two years, each 'humanitarian crisis analysis' has explicitly included a chapter on humanitarian development work, which is the basis for joint work. The humanitarian planning cycle is also used as an opportunity for a joint discussion on risk and response: every year, ahead of the global humanitarian allocation in December, humanitarian, development and peace colleagues for a given country come together to identify humanitarian and development needs and discuss options for parallel, joint or sequential response.

Box 4: Regional strategies enabling joined-up approaches in crisis-affected states

In 2018, the Swedish government added US$46 million to its development budget for sub-Saharan Africa, to fund a new three-year (2019–2021) Sahel Regional Strategy.[30] It responded to the need to address the chronic and multidimensional challenges in a region in which Sweden had little in-country embassy presence and few bilateral development strategies. The regional strategy seeks to respond to both the impacts and root causes of extensive poverty, recurrent humanitarian crises,[31] fragile institutions, deteriorating security and climate change. Its approach includes support to existing multilateral regional initiatives for humanitarian, development and peacebuilding, including the Liptako-Gourma Authority (covering the border region between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), the G5 Sahel and the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.

Operational guidance

At the latest count, according to the recent DAC peer review, Sweden had a total of 63 strategies: six regional, 25 country, 12 thematic and 19 on multilateral cooperation. These all clearly align to the priorities set out in the overarching 2016 Policy Framework, but the peer review suggests that staff might often get lost in this "forest of strategies",[32] unclear on the common priorities and how to implement them. The peer review therefore calls for a "consolidation of strategies" to ensure clarity, allow time and build skills for implementation.

There is potentially a sliding scale for this consolidation: at an extreme end, moving towards a common strategy, which – in accordance with the idea of 'collective outcomes' – would articulate a common set of goals at the regional or country levels. This was proposed by the Swedish National Audit Office's evaluation, which suggested that a barrier to cooperation was the fact that although there is a common high-level strategic focus on the importance of the nexus, there is no articulation of common goals at an operationally strategic level. This idea has not yet generated widespread support, primarily because of the principled separation of humanitarian assistance, though it may also reflect the fact that outside Sweden, the experience of articulating collective outcomes in the New Way of Working is proving so problematic.[33] This does not, however, have to rule out articulating common goals or long-term results for Swedish ODA, to which humanitarian, development and peace interventions can contribute. The centrality of the concepts of resilience[34] and leaving no one behind provide a useful frame for these.

At the other end of the scale, staff and evaluations agreed that there was a need to make better practical sense of what is already there. While there is strong policy steer on the nexus from the top, and many examples of good practice on the ground, there appears to be a 'missing middle' of clear practical guidelines. The absence of such a description of

what working at the nexus entails evidently creates confusion and devaluation. This is far from unique to Sweden – it is at the heart of many challenges to nexus work.

This is actively recognised and at the time of writing, it was on the radar of the newly formed Sida nexus working group. The MFA had recently developed an internal note and staff there recognise that there is now a need for a clear steer from the government on how to operationalise the nexus: they are drafting a guiding document and looking into what government guidance would be required to support this and to help overcome any tensions between the three parts of the nexus. As they and the new Sida nexus working group develop their briefing notes, it will be important to ensure that these are written and communicated in a way that clearly helps staff to navigate the 'forest', rather than adding more trees.

A suite of operational guidance, internal briefings and toolboxes already exists on a range of topics, from a Toolbox on Peace to briefings on multidimensional poverty and resilience, and a compendium of humanitarian operational guidelines. These could be consolidated to support practical application and learning, helping staff to know when and how to apply the many different approaches to which Sida is committed and how these fit together. They could give substance to the menu of options for collaboration, complementarity and coherence implicit in the DAC recommendation and the types of approaches that might be considered in different crisis types, stages and political contexts.

Building common understanding is part of clarifying guidance. Working at the nexus demands a common language – a shared understanding of terms that are either not commonly used by all or are understood differently – including 'risk', 'vulnerability', 'resilience' and 'most left behind'. Sida's experience of piloting resilience systems analysis showed the problems that confusion over basic terms can create.[35] Overcoming this takes more than defining vocabulary – it involves dialogue regarding the fundamental concepts of the function of Sweden's ODA.[36] The points of departure of the three parts of the nexus are necessarily different. 'Humanitarian' can broadly be characterised as saving lives; 'peace' as stability and security; and 'development' as opportunities for people living in poverty. These clear differences bring the benefits of clear mandates and divisions of labour,[37] but they can also bring quite different mindsets and working assumptions about the purpose of ODA, which need to be openly discussed from the outset. The Sida nexus working group will be an important test ground for these. Some of these fundamental mindset questions are around reconciling an economic growth model of development with a risk-informed model that focuses on those most affected by poverty and those most vulnerable, and others around the parameters of how ODA can contribute to peacebuilding.

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To fill the ‘missing middle’ of practical guidance, Sweden now needs to:

- Translate top-line commitments into a clear, practical and well-communicated communiqué which explains – for both internal and external audiences – Sweden’s role in and vision and avenues for implementing the triple nexus.
- Work collaboratively between ministries and departments to clarify basic terms and definitions of what the nexus means for Sweden. The process and the final outputs would support a common understanding among staff of the overlap with and distinguishing features of resilience and articulate Sweden’s position on aspects including collective outcomes.
- Consolidate and develop a suite of operational guidance on putting the nexus into practice, including tools and briefing modules to support country and thematic teams at each stage of the strategy and programme cycle. This should build on and consolidate existing tools and guidance on resilience and on each of the three ‘legs’ of the triple nexus.

3. Programme and allocation cycle

3.1 Assessments and analysis

Lessons: Although Sweden maintains separate analysis of humanitarian and development risks and needs, there is scope – which could be further exploited – within both processes to include a comprehensive analysis of situations and build a shared understanding. In the past decade, Sweden has invested in piloting resilience systems analysis and evolving multidimensional poverty analysis: these provide a strong basis for a holistic understanding of risk, vulnerability and needs, but lessons from these approaches are yet to be consistently brought together and applied in all crisis-risk contexts.

Working at the nexus demands assessments and analysis which take into account the full set of risks, needs, vulnerabilities, coping capacities and contextual factors in any context. Common action must be based on a common understanding of what the problem is. This can be in the form of complementary analysis which involves and integrates wider perspectives and dimensions, or joint analysis exercises. Recent in-country research on collective international efforts to work at the nexus found that in general, there was not enough robust joint analysis of risks, systems and root causes. This meant that risks and needs might be "under-recognised and under-prioritised"[38] and can lead to solutions being misdiagnosed, misdirected or misguided.

In the case of Sweden, analysis tools allow for both complementary and joined-up analysis which could provide a robust basis for action. According to the recent peer review by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), integrating conflict perspective into development planning has boosted Sweden's ability to work in fragile and crisis-affected states, as have initiatives for joint risk and resilience. Within this toolkit, humanitarian analysis, multidimensional poverty analysis and resilience analysis all have a role to play and concerted efforts need to be made to ensure that their respective strengths and insights can come together in a comprehensive shared understanding of the situation in any given country.

Humanitarian analysis

Sweden has a clear rationale for humanitarian analysis to remain separate from, but complementary to, poverty or joint analysis. Respect for humanitarian principles is paramount for Sweden, so crises are prioritised according to needs, assessed against clear criteria which includes indicators on scale, severity, financial coverage, national

capacity and forgotten crises. The specific humanitarian crisis analyses (HCAs) are then developed for each of the selected countries.[39]

While it is distinct, the humanitarian analysis actively seeks to engage and connect with development and peace analysis and programming. As explained above, development staff members are involved in the HCA process – first in meetings around the December global allocations so that they have a clear overview of humanitarian needs, and then in actively jointly developing the humanitarian-development chapters of the HCAs, which are seen as crucial in shaping the nexus agendas for each country. The global Humanitarian Outlook document which summarises all the HCAs to present the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)'s humanitarian priorities for the year ahead also makes clear connections with development and peace programming. Given that it is the single global Sida document focused on crisis-affected settings, it has an important function in framing this shared analysis for headquarters and for country teams.

Poverty analysis

Sweden has a well-developed approach to multidimensional poverty analysis which forms the basis of its overarching analytical approach to country development plans. At its heart are questions about **who** is living in poverty, **how** *(*i.e. what dimensions of poverty), and **why** *(*the underlying structural, institutional and developmental reasons). This encompasses not only the shortage of material assets but also the lack of power and influence, choices, safety and human rights.[40] It defines 'multidimensional poverty' as something that "deprives people of the freedom to decide over and shape their own lives. It robs them of the opportunity to choose on matters of fundamental importance to themselves. Lack of power and choice and lack of material resources form the essence of poverty."[41]

A recent update of the definition now explicitly incorporates risk and vulnerability, an important first step to understanding risks and needs in crisis-affected settings. It recognises that "living in poverty or near poverty also affects one's exposure to risks and vulnerability for falling into poverty, falling deeper into poverty or remaining in chronic poverty. Understanding risks and vulnerability is an important component in understanding the multidimensional nature of poverty." Adding human security as a new, fourth dimension of poverty, it articulates the links between poverty and fragility, conflict, climate and humanitarian needs, noting the importance of linkages between long-term development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in analysis, planning and implementation[42,43].

In theory, the process as well as the content of the multidimensional poverty analysis (MDPA) should allow for connected and continuous understanding in volatile and protracted settings. The key principles of the MDPA are that it is flexible to the context as well as the needs and resources of the team; that it achieves a shared understanding of multidimensional poverty; that it is the result of iterative multiple discussions and regularly revisited; and that it draws on and synthesises multiple existing sources of analysis. On paper, this allows plenty of scope for the incorporation of crisis and conflict-related risks

and needs, although doing so will depend both on clear guidance and country team engagement. In practice, however, there is still room for more systematic inclusion and revisiting of risk analysis, a point also noted in the 2017 internal evaluation. As each country works its way through their strategy processes, the aim is to ensure that the risk-informed MDPAs are well applied, though this may involve a time lag for those who are currently only at the midpoint of their strategies.

Resilience analysis

Sweden has invested in piloting a resilience systems analysis (RSA) in a number of selected countries, which informs and complements its MDPA. Where the MDPA focuses on people in poverty, the RSA analysed the systems that can exacerbate or reduce their resilience to shocks.

In 2015–2016, Sida worked with the OECD to pilot its new RSA approach in seven countries. The OECD RSA translates international commitments on resilience – from the Sendai Framework for Risk Reduction to the Sustainable Development Goals and the World Humanitarian Summit – into a practical technical toolkit. The aim is to build a common analysis of the main risks and coping capacities, identify programming gaps and develop a 'roadmap' of action with clear roles and responsibilities. It was designed to help rethink programming through a 'risk lens' and by convening diverse expertise, encourage understanding of the complex interconnections of a wide set of risks and capacities at all levels of the system – from the national to the hyper-local.[44]

This pilot has had many benefits for Sweden's ability to work at the nexus. According to the recent OECD DAC peer review, it has enabled Sida staff to enhance synergies, focus official development assistance (ODA) on root causes and prioritise conflict perspectives in its approaches.[45] A review of the seven-country pilot also found that, overall, this approach had strengthened risk-informed programming and prioritisation and promoted better coherence between humanitarian and development action. Staff members have also reported how it has helped to understand and overcome 'mindset' differences. At the same time, externally, Sida has been able to build on its experience to work with the DAC to support and encourage the UN system to engage with RSA, including in the regional Liptako-Gourma/Sahel analysis.

While the RSA experience has been important in developing Sweden's nexus thinking and forging links in the selected countries, it is unclear where it should go next. Pressures on headquarters' analytical capacity curtailed the continued use and further roll-out of the RSA, which has been superseded by the MDPA as Sida's overarching analytical tool. The review of the pilots identified several technical areas for improvement, including its targeting of the most vulnerable and its integration of peacebuilding and state-building considerations. However, it also posed questions about the feasibility of systematic use in all Sida's development and humanitarian cooperation countries, which would demand staff resources, flexibility and, above all, clear leadership and cross-agency engagement. At present, RSA remains an extremely useful tool for joint analysis, but one which has largely fallen out of use within Sida, though it still guides thinking. With the current momentum to define Sweden's nexus approach, there are clear opportunities to ensure that the valuable lessons and analytical tools of the RSAs are clearly and firmly integrated

into the MDPAs. This might also help to address common confusion among staff about the difference between ‘resilience’ and the ‘nexus’.

Programme planning and design

Flowing from the analysis process, the planning of the programme portfolio also follows separate tracks for humanitarian and development but allows many opportunities for joint working and discussion. The humanitarian portfolio is planned and agreed at the Stockholm level, in close and ongoing dialogue with the country team. For the development portfolio, country directors and teams have a large degree of delegated authority, but also connect regularly with development, peace and regional teams in Stockholm through both frequently scheduled calls and ad hoc contact. While both humanitarian and development programmes are to some extent pre-committed at the start of their respective annual or four-yearly cycle, there is also space to adapt and shift the programme portfolio as situations change: a third of the global humanitarian budget is retained to react to changing needs and development funds have considerable latitude to be refocused.

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To connect its understanding of humanitarian, development and peace risks and needs, and ensure that programming and strategy are informed by comprehensive analyses, Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) could:

- Ensure more systematic inclusion of risk analysis in the multidimensional poverty analysis that underpins the development strategies, integrating lessons and tools from the resilience systems analysis experience.
- Routinely establish regular review points within each year of the four-year development strategy cycle to revisit analysis and review changes to the risk and needs profile and recalibrate planning accordingly.

3.2 Programming approaches

Lessons: Sweden has developed a growing and diverse portfolio of practical experience in working at the nexus. Although these fit into a broad typology, there is no top-down blueprint: instead, approaches are rightly developed according to context-specific situations and opportunities. While there are examples of a transitional or sequential model, which hands over from humanitarian to development, simultaneous approaches appear to be more common, where humanitarian and development investments work side by side.

The nexus is better understood in practice than in concept. Recent system-wide case-studies on nexus-related coordination found that practical action at the programme level made more sense than policy definitions at the headquarters level. Progress was most evident in bottom-up collaborative solutions focusing on specific problems in specific contexts.[46]

The same is true for Sweden and staff at Sida have certainly taken a pragmatic approach to 'working at' the nexus as well as 'thinking about' the nexus. While guidance, tools and procedures are still a work in progress at headquarters level, Sida has many active examples of putting the nexus into practice in countries and regions. These are designed and implemented on a context-specific basis. As later sections of this report explore, there is now a need to document and learn from these discrete examples to develop a guiding menu of approaches.

The operational guidelines for Sida's Humanitarian Unit[47] identify the three categories of contexts and outline the possible approaches for humanitarian and development synergies. In the four years since these were formulated, practical application has expanded the menu of action in each area, but the typology is still helpful.

- Humanitarian crises with significant humanitarian and development support: Approaches here could include common context analysis,[48] inclusion of risk, resilience and humanitarian perspectives in development strategies; flexible and innovative development programming and strengthened coordination.
- High-risk contexts with large development but limited humanitarian support: Promote risk and resilience in analysis, strategy and programming.
- Protracted or recurrent crises with humanitarian but no development support: Promote synergies with other development actors, including civil society.

In parallel, the annual Humanitarian Outlook[49] identifies four categories of humanitarian contexts, by stage and severity:

- Severe deterioration (for 2019, these included Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Venezuela).
- Stagnant but severely distressed (including Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Sudan) – protracted crises which require a development approach to root causes of crisis and to pave the way to stability and development.
- Showing potential of stabilising (Burundi and Iraq).
- Improved to the point of no longer requiring humanitarian assistance (Mauritania and Senegal).

It also notes that five out of the 15 largest humanitarian crises supported by Sida are in fact engaged in peace or stabilisation processes (Central African Republic, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan and Yemen), necessitating urgent investment in peacebuilding and peace dividends to support these fragile opportunities.

Although Sweden has not explicitly put these two typologies together, it is easy to see how they could be combined to broadly present the experience and options for working at the nexus. Figure 1 shows what this might look like, adding in a fifth column of 'high risk' and mapping select examples of country practice. Figure 2 shows the balances of humanitarian, development and peace spending in crisis-affected states, giving an indication of which might be fertile for making substantive connections.

Figure 1: Categories of contexts for working at the nexus

Protracted/ recurrent with high humanitarian and no/minimal development		CAR Yemen	Chad		Pakistan
High risk, with high development and limited humanitarian support	Kenya		Palestine	Uganda	
High humanitarian and development support		Afghanistan	Bangladesh Ethiopia South Sudan DRC	Somalia Iraq	
	High risk	**Severe deterioration**	**Stagnant but severely distressed**	**Potential of stabilising**	**Improved to no longer require humanitarian assistance**

Note: The position of countries in the matrix is according to the stage and severity at the start of 2019, according to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's Humanitarian Outlook and levels of assistance according to 2017 and 2019 data. Countries listed are illustrative rather than comprehensive.

Figure 2: Sweden's official development assistance to its top 20 country recipients of humanitarian assistance (humanitarian assistance, conflict peace and security and other official development assistance), 2008–2017



Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Note: The 20 recipient countries that received the largest gross disbursements of official humanitarian assistance from Sweden over the period 2008–2017.

Sequential approaches

Putting the nexus into practice can involve many different configurations of humanitarian and development assistance – 'preventative', where development and peacebuilding investments address the risk of crisis and prevent the need for humanitarian assistance; 'simultaneous', where humanitarian, development and peace investments work to comparative advantage in the same contexts to address different dimensions of crises; and 'sequential', where development and peacebuilding investments allow humanitarian assistance to transition into exiting out.

Given the high demand on a relatively small budget, Sida is under pressure to tightly prioritise its humanitarian assistance according to severity and to seek all options to exit where conditions allow. Overstaying in one stagnant or improving crisis limits the funds available to respond to a severe or deteriorating crisis elsewhere. There is, therefore, a strong focus from the Humanitarian Unit on finding opportunities for transitioning out. This is perhaps easiest and clearest cut in the cases of rapid-onset disasters, such as Sida's response to tropical Cyclone Idai in Mozambique in 2019, an approach which Sida hopes to make commonplace in similar future cases.

Box 5: Mozambique: Pre-establishing transition from humanitarian to development

When tropical Cyclone Idai hit Mozambique in March 2019, Sweden was among the major donors which rapidly responded with humanitarian assistance, allocating over US$11 million to the response. Very early in the response, two weeks after the cyclone, the humanitarian team (which used the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's Rapid Response Mechanism to release funds within 24 hours) began negotiating its humanitarian exit strategy with the in-country development team. It was agreed that there would be a clear cut-off date in January 2020 for humanitarian funding, and a clear plan to transition to development investments for longer-term recovery and resilience. The result is a planned three-phase programme of support: the first phase consists of the US$11 million of humanitarian funding issued to UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) partners; the second and third phases are directed to an NGO consortium which will shift over the period from response to recovery and development – this will consist of US$5.5 million of humanitarian funding for phase two, followed by at least another US$5.5 million of development funding for phase three. As a potential model for other rapid-onset disasters, it will be important to monitor and learn from how well this works in practice over the three phases.

Situations where entire countries are in a position that is favourable to transitioning out of humanitarian support may be relatively rare, although as the 2019 Humanitarian Outlook notes, there are examples: Mauritania and Senegal most recently; Angola and Rwanda historically. More common are possibilities for transitioning humanitarian caseloads within

a crisis-affected state, such as people affected by a discrete disaster, or certain protracted refugee populations. Regular country meetings involving humanitarian and development staff, as well as the annual cross-team and cross-discipline discussions around the humanitarian crisis analyses, should provide fora to identify and respond to these opportunities.

Simultaneous approaches

While transitioning to a position where humanitarian assistance is no longer required might be the desired goal, many countries at all stages of crisis require simultaneous approaches to address different dimensions of crisis, risk and vulnerability. A range of approaches are emerging from recent country practice. These are not developed from a top-down blueprint but from shared analysis and collaboration between in-country and thematic teams. The following examples highlight how these manifest in three countries.

Box 6: Supporting peace in a severe humanitarian crisis

Yemen is a priority country for Sida's humanitarian assistance, receiving the largest single country allocation in 2019 – US$26 million. Given the situation in Yemen, Sweden has had no development presence there for the past six years. There is currently no country strategy and minimal development spend (Figure 2). Despite these limitations, it was understood that there is an urgent window to support immediate peace dividends following the peace agreement. Humanitarian staff within Sida are therefore now working with the European Union's development cooperation team on a large-scale development programme to identify and 'stretch' more stable areas in 23 fragile provinces in Yemen in order to fund tangible peace dividends in the form of public services and facilities.

Box 7: Supporting sustainable solutions in refugee crises

In both Bangladesh and Uganda, Sida has made concerted strategic and financial efforts to address the long-term needs of refugees and host communities through development assistance, and their immediate acute needs through humanitarian assistance. In Uganda, the multidimensional poverty analysis (MDPA) process allowed for increased focus on refugees and the host communities which is now reflected also in the new strategy thanks to joint efforts between humanitarian and development staff. Both humanitarian and development funds are now directed to partners working under the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) including on social protection.

In Bangladesh, there was a large injection – US$30 million – of development funding from Sweden (one of the first donors to provide development funding for the crisis) early in the Rohingya refugee crisis, in addition to previous flexible use

of development funds. Under the newly created fifth development strategy area to support refugee and host community resilience, it focused on funding protection, health and environmental rehabilitation projects. This included both complementary elements to the humanitarian funded projects – often within the same partner agreements – and transition elements, for example, shifting to development-funded liquid petroleum gas stoves as a means of addressing basic needs and reducing the risk of environmental degradation and conflict over resources such as firewood.

Box 8: Multiple approaches in a protracted multi-crisis context

Somalia faces multiple simultaneous protracted and cyclical crises and is a long-term recipient of both humanitarian and development funding. As the onset of the 2017 famine became clear, Sida increased its humanitarian allocation to its operational partners but also contacted all its development partners to request that they consider what they could do to shift focus to address the immediate and longer-term risks and consequences. Learning from this, there is now an impetus to include contingency for the next crisis in every development funding proposal. At the same time, there is an emphasis on agencies working together on multisector area-based approaches rather than on an isolated project basis, and Sida supports these with both humanitarian and development funds. As we have seen in an earlier section, the needs of internally displaced persons are now mainstreamed in the development plan – to transition from treating them as a humanitarian caseload to them being part of long-term livelihoods and basic services concerns.

Suggestion for Sweden as a donor

To build on country-specific experience of supporting nexus programming, Sida could:

- Develop a guiding menu of approaches to support country teams and partners to identify practical options for programming. This could identify the various types of programming options, which country teams and partners can then adapt for their own settings. It would include:
    - Sequential approaches which enable development and humanitarian programmes to scale up and down, or phase in and out as a crisis emerges, intensifies or contracts.
    - Simultaneous approaches which lay the foundations for longer-term development and peacebuilding alongside humanitarian programmes.

3.3 Funding models and instruments

Lessons: Sweden's funding models allow significant scope to work at the nexus, despite the clear demarcation of humanitarian and development assistance. Although there is some specific funding to facilitate work at the nexus, there is a strong sense that new budget lines or instruments are not essential: inbuilt

flexibility, combined with decentralised decision-making for country teams should be sufficient to enable development funds to address crisis-related issues. More could be done, however, to ensure that this flexibility to fund the nexus is less dependent on country team discretion and is more widely understood and exploited.

Development funding

Sweden's total budget for ODA is agreed annually by the Swedish Parliament and managed by the MFA, which implements and allocates a portion directly, and supervises allocation of the rest by other agencies. Of this, Sida is responsible for direct implementation of the bulk of ODA, amounting to US$4.3 billion in 2019 (Appendix 4).

Within Sida, funding envelopes for development are allocated to regional or operational departments and then allocated to country teams in accordance with funding requirements set out in the country or regional strategies. Indicative multi-year budgets for each country are agreed, then specific funding allocations are made annually in accordance with any variance required. Some flexibility is held at both the department level and at the MFA, but there are no formal contingency funds.

As such, there is no single separate global budget line for peace or stabilisation programming within Sida. Of the approximately US$114 million that Sida disbursed last year on peacebuilding, approximately US$68 million was managed by country and regional teams in accordance with their strategies, while there was a global budget allocation of US$46 million for the Strategy for Sustainable Peace to support global peacebuilding programmes implemented by the UN, World Bank and key peacebuilding international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Outside of Sida, the MFA directly allocates core contributions to peacekeeping missions and multilateral peace or development organisations, and also to the Folke Bernadotte Academy, a Swedish government agency which focuses on peace and security.[50]

Within countries, under decentralised decision-making, country directors (or heads of missions) have a high degree of autonomy over how they allocate their budget and development partners have a good degree of flexibility built into their agreements. Out of 35 embassies with a development budget, 30 have full financial delegation. In most countries, they have financial authority for projects under US$8.5 million and for transferring funding between areas within a financial strategy.[51] There is also scope to move funds between budget lines and adjust total budgets for each strategy up or down by 10% to respond to changing contexts. In theory, there is room for country and regional directors to maintain contingency in their budgets, but there is also pressure to programme as much funding as possible. Possible solutions may involve a combination of ring-fencing a contingency budget at the departmental level and making management of country-level contingency funds a routine part of strategic planning.

Budget lines are not regarded by most staff as a barrier to necessary and innovative approaches: there are cases of country teams using development funds to support humanitarian funds and partners to implement longer-term programmes that build

resilience in difficult environments. Examples include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where development funds were allocated to support the UN-managed humanitarian Country-based Pooled Fund and to support longer-term resilience-focused approaches, and Bangladesh, where development partnerships on maternal health were redirected to work on the refugee crisis. Widespread cross-budget use of funds might cause some bureaucratic reporting problems, but these were not widely felt to be prohibitive or insurmountable – although they could be clarified to avoid being off-putting.

Humanitarian allocation

As with development assistance, part – about half – of the annual humanitarian budget is allocated directly by the MFA for core support to multilateral humanitarian agencies and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) pooled fund,[52] and the rest – amounting to just over US$443 million[53] – is channelled via Sida. This is then allocated directly by the Humanitarian Unit in Stockholm, rather than via country teams, following a set rules-based and needs-based methodology (Section 3.1). This ensures it respects humanitarian principles and means that humanitarian assistance can be allocated to countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or Yemen, which are not development cooperation partners.

Humanitarian allocation is therefore an annual process which reassesses where the most severe needs and gaps are each year and directs funding accordingly. It aims to provide implementing partners with most of their funding early in the year but also to retain enough contingency to respond to new needs that arise in the course of the year. It therefore has two budget lines: a 'predictability budget line', which disburses about two thirds of the humanitarian budget to partners at the start of the year via Sida, and a 'flexibility budget line', which is kept in allocated or reserve funds or tied to a rapid response mechanism for 24-hour disbursement to pre-approved partners. If not needed for new crises, the flexibility budget will be allocated based on needs to top-up partners' budgets during mid-year and end-year revisions.

Within the boundaries of its need-based criteria, Sweden prides itself on the flexibility of its humanitarian support – its implementing partners also rated Sida very highly in this regard.[54] Sweden aims to be the leader in fulfilling commitments to unearmarked humanitarian funding and has increased its already high proportion – from 38% in 2017 to nearly 56% in 2018.[55] All the humanitarian assistance from the MFA is in the form of unearmarked core funding to multilateral agencies or pooled funds. This does not, of course, automatically translate in practice to these partners working at the nexus: while, in theory, it could enable it and provide the basis for country and global discussions, it does not de facto promote or guarantee it.

Sida tries to balance this flexibility with the predictability necessary for agencies to function effectively, especially in situations of long-term need. While allocations can only be made annually, all Sida's humanitarian funding is to agencies with whom it has multi-year partnership agreements. Where appropriate and feasible, it can issue multi-year contracts – 25 of these were signed in 2017, including for four-year programmes in CAR, Palestine, South Sudan and Yemen.[56] It also supports a small number of partners

through country-specific programme-based approach (PBA) agreements: one of these is to the Norwegian Refugee Council and has been recognised as a positive example of how multi-year funding can enable nexus approaches and be catalytic in securing further support. According to a recent study, it has given the Norwegian Refugee Council "the flexibility to respond and scale up responses to unforeseen crises in new areas of operation in DRC, and to initiate activities that have failed to attract donor support. Its use of PBA to initiate early recovery activities also encouraged donors to allocate additional funds."[57]

Specific funding mechanisms

It is widely felt that the inbuilt flexibility in Sweden's ODA means that there is little need for specific funds to incentivise or support work at the nexus. Indeed, some felt that this would be counter-productive, siloing humanitarian-development-peace coordination instead of mainstreaming it as a way of working.

However, in December 2017, a dedicated 'resilience' budget line was created within Sida's Humanitarian Unit. Currently representing around 6% of humanitarian spend and potentially set to rise to up to 10%, it was created in order to ring-fence a small proportion of humanitarian assistance to fund discrete projects which did not quite fit the severe humanitarian needs profile but which development programmes were not yet able to pick up, or places where there was no development funding, such as parts of the Sahel. Recipients have included the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Association of Charitable Foundations (ACF) which used the funding to undertake multi-year analysis and programmes with a focus on addressing chronic livelihoods, as well as nutrition needs and vulnerabilities.

There does not seem to be an appetite for moving towards joint humanitarian-development funds – the principled separation is well accepted, and there seems to be little added value in terms of flexibility. However, the recent evaluation by the Swedish National Audit Office suggests the government has not made clear what the existing opportunities are for joint financing; that there are technological opportunities for co-financing and joint financial reporting which are not being exploited for administrative reasons: either administrators do not know about them, or they find them administratively burdensome.[58] There are good examples of co-financing – including the three-year support to the INGO consortium-led Somalia Resilience Programme (SomRep) which was funded through humanitarian and development funds – so the issue may be about sharing learning and making the potential better known.

It is worth noting that the focus within the MFA and Sida is primarily on traditional grant-based funding rather than other financing initiatives. However, examples of innovative financing are emerging. Although the OECD DAC recommendation refers to the possibility of using ODA to "catalyse the full range of financial flows",[59] staff members within Sida and MFA are primarily focused on making their direct humanitarian and development grant-making as effective as possible. There are, however, several examples of Sweden using alternative models, ranging from support to the Global Concessional Financing Facility for refugees to investing in parametric insurance for

pastoralists in Ethiopia and financially incentivising private-sector provision of renewable energy to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It has also developed guarantee-based financing models to enable microfinance providers to provide credit to refugees and their host communities.

Box 9: Using guarantees to support refugees' livelihoods

The Sida/UNHCR Partial Credit Guarantee Facility aims to encourage and incentivise financial services providers (FSPs) to lend to refugees – a practice which they might otherwise consider too risky – and to develop products and services tailored to refugees' specific needs without compromising FSPs' risk management standards. Sida, assumes the role of the guarantor up to a value of US$15 million, partially covering the risk of loan defaults. In development since 2016 and due to start in Jordan and Uganda and based on market assessments in the two countries, the facility will partially cover a microfinance investment vehicle from the Grameen Credit Agricole Foundation, financing three or four FSPs to target refugees and host communities.[60]

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To maximise the potential of Sweden's flexible funding, Sida and the MFA could:

- Protect contingency funds within Sida's development budgets, both at a departmental level and through active management of country contingency funds, as a routine part of strategic planning.
- Clarify to Sida staff in thematic and country teams what the financial reporting requirements are for funding programmes that use cross-budget lines, clearly communicating the potential for co-financing and cross-budget use of funds to avoid unintentionally letting bureaucratic concerns disincentivise uptake of opportunities.

3.4 Partnerships

Lessons: Sweden is actively engaging with its partners at country and global levels to make connections at the nexus. So far, global dialogue has focused on humanitarian international non-governmental organisation partners. Although there is evidence of strong country-level discussion and action with multilateral partners, this is currently more ad hoc and global discussions on the nexus with peace and development partners do not appear to have been instigated. There is now a need to co-develop a systematic approach of integrating nexus considerations into ways of working with partners, particularly with multi-mandate organisations. This would help to clarify expectations on both sides as to what Sweden seeks from its partners and can offer to them.

Sida is actively promoting discussion and encouraging action on the nexus with its partners. Programming at the nexus is specifically detailed in the Humanitarian Unit's new NGO guidelines[61] which require, among other cross-cutting requirements, for organisations to set out and report against how they will 'do no harm' in terms of conflict sensitivity, and how they will work to bridge the humanitarian-development divide and complement their humanitarian response with longer-term development interventions. There is also a focus on sustainability – addressing root causes of vulnerabilities – and on exit strategies, which is a requirement for NGOs applying for multi-year support. The Humanitarian Unit has also organised two partnership fora[62] in 2019, bringing its NGO partners together in Stockholm to share experience and learning on nexus programming.

Having common partners which work with both humanitarian and long-term development programmes is critical to success. Several of Sida's NGO partners are multi-mandate agencies who, as well as being funded by civil society budget lines, receive both humanitarian and development funding and are actively encouraged to make connections between them. In Mali, for example, Action against Hunger receives both humanitarian and development funding for its nutrition work: the humanitarian component seeks to integrate nutrition case management into the health system, in parallel with development-oriented preventative measures to reduce needs. However, as the OECD DAC peer review noted, these connections are not systematically encouraged and though there is often join-up at a country-level, NGOs can receive funding from multiple strategies for the same country in a disconnected manner. Under a review of the civil society strategy, Sida is exploring opportunities to address this, with one option being to delegate funds for a particular NGO to a single strategy.[63] At the same time, it is also reaching out to development partners such as Mercy Corps who have a developed resilience approach.

The majority of both development and humanitarian assistance from Sida to major crisis-affected countries goes via multilateral organisations (Figure 3). There are many strong examples of how this dual relationship has been used to ensure connections are made, from calling for famine response proposals in Somalia in 2017 to supporting a multi-year programme through the World Food Programme (WFP) in order to shift from humanitarian to a development footing in Sudan. Sweden's support has also enabled it to engage with strategic conversations at country-level with multilateral humanitarian and development organisations including FAO, WFP and others engaged with the New Way of Working and the Refugee Compacts. However, unlike humanitarian assistance to NGOs from Sida, there is no formalised partnership expectation for multilaterals to make the connections and it is largely dependent on in-country leadership and relationships.

Unlike in stable settings, a very small proportion of ODA in crisis-affected countries tends to be channelled via the state. While this avoids difficult questions of working with governments to address crisis, risk and resilience in constrained environments where governance is limited, it also means that – with some exceptions – Sweden has little scope to build relationships with national authorities as technical partners or to support and incentivise fundamental change. As more crises and risks occur in long-term development cooperation settings, Sida may need to develop its experience of partnering with state actors at the nexus, particularly to fulfil the peace and development 'legs' – something which it presently does via multilateral agencies and to some degree, through local authorities. At the same time, it can continue to align with other donors and

multilateral agencies as part of an international effort to work with national authorities. Its support of the international system to work with local authorities in Somalia following the announcement of the closure of Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp is a practical example of how this can work.

Suggestion for Sweden as a donor

To strengthen partner capacity to programme adaptively at the triple nexus, Sida and the MFA could:

- Articulate expectations of nexus working in partner guidelines and agreements, making it clear what Sida expects from partners in this regard and what partners can expect from Sida.
- Explicitly discuss roles and expectations for those multilateral partners which receive core funding from the MFA.
- Find ways to make connections between multiple agreements to the same partners, particularly multi-mandate organisations which receive a combination of humanitarian, development and/or peacebuilding funds.

Figure 3: Channels of delivery of Swedish official development assistance to its 20 largest humanitarian recipients, 2017



Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Notes: The twenty recipient countries that received the largest gross disbursements of official humanitarian assistance from Sweden in 2017. Data in US$ million, current prices.

3.5 Monitoring, learning and evaluation

Lessons: While there are many examples of working at the nexus and initiatives to support future work, information and learning about these is not yet optimally shared within and between teams. A new nexus working group is starting to explore ways that current examples can be mapped and more routinely tracked. At the same time, there is a recognised need for more evidence of 'what works' to reduce risks, needs and vulnerabilities. Sweden's flexible funding, core support and new thinking around adaptive programming provide the building blocks for a risk-embracing outcomes-based model, which could be more systematically part of programme partnerships.

Information management

As working at the nexus must be context-specific and iterative, it requires understanding and learning what works. Information gathering and sharing is also necessary for coordination, coherence and complementarity: organisations cannot make connections if they do not have a full picture of what they can connect.

Sida and the MFA recognise that this is a weak area and they are beginning to explore ways to better document the enabling information to work at the nexus and the ongoing activities in this area. Both the internal review and the DAC peer review[64] have concluded that knowledge management is generally weak within and between Sida and the MFA, meaning that opportunities for sharing learning between ODA streams and countries and changing course on strategy, policy and programming can be missed. The headquarters teams running global thematic strategies – including humanitarian and peace – do not have a systematic way of gathering information about activities in their areas that are funded under country strategies.[65] Equally, regional and country teams do not have this thematic overview of what is happening in their or in others' geographic areas. Building such an information sharing system, notes the DAC review, could support making strategic and operational synergies – something that is at present reliant on meetings and good communication between staff and can be jeopardised by staff turnover.

Sida does, of course, have a digital project management and tracking system, called Trac. It has been suggested by staff and by the Swedish National Audit Office evaluation that this could be better used to support implementation and information sharing about nexus opportunities and activities. Trac does already include a relevant project information field, but this is broad and optional and frames the nexus primarily as a function of humanitarian rather than development assistance. Making this a required and searchable field which reflects the triple nexus could be a concrete step towards better information management.

Monitoring and results

Monitoring progress and measuring results against the nexus is bound to be difficult. Baseline data or data systems are often missing, annual reporting cycles do not fit seasonal or long-term impact timeframes and attribution is difficult. The experience of

setting ‘collective outcomes’ in specific countries has highlighted some of the difficulties of setting meaningful joint objectives.

However, building practical indicators and trialling methods for monitoring against them is a necessary part of the iterative process of implementing the triple nexus. Sweden aims to be an evidence-based donor and there is a strong desire to monitor and measure results to find out what really works to achieve the ultimate goals of reducing people’s multidimensional poverty in the crisis-affected and crisis-prone contexts – not just to map processes and methods. Indeed, some staff expressed the need to ‘plateau and learn’ before scaling up or spreading out new approaches.

Expected programme results need to be framed in way that does not disincentivise – and instead actively incentivises – changing course and taking risks. It is clear that development projects to address insecurity and vulnerability in highly fragile settings demand a high comfort level with risk – financial, operational and reputational – but as Sida’s internal evaluation of the nexus noted, the results agenda of development cooperation can disincentivise working in places where there were high risks to these being achieved.[66] At the same time, although many country teams encourage it, and flexible agreements enable it, at present there is no overall obligation or specific requirement for partners to consider work at the nexus – making this explicit could counteract the pressures towards risk aversion in development action. The experience of the resilience systems analysis pilots is instructive about the need to ensure reporting against intentions. While priorities and recommendations for supporting resilience were identified in the RSA process, these were not translated into reporting requirements, reducing accountability and missing out on learning opportunities.[67]

Adaptive programming, based on holistic and regular analysis, should in theory allow country teams to shift the focus and content of programmes to respond to new patterns in risk and need. This is a natural progression from the high degree of flexibility that Sweden affords its partners and country teams and the broad results areas and theories of change set out in the country strategies. Aligning to new global interest in these approaches, Sweden is also actively engaging in developing and applying the linked ideas of ‘Doing Development Differently’, adaptiveness and complexity. Sida is adopting a new learning-based adaptive approach to results-based management, which focuses on long-term sustainable results and encourages real-time changes to programming. Like the triple nexus, this is iterative and experimental and currently far from becoming standard practice. Pilots for adaptive programming and budgeting under the Africa Department intend to provide wider learning.[68]

Iterative learning and meaningful monitoring demand resources from both partners and donor offices. Unearmarked and flexible support to agencies can help to resource the staff and systems needed for this, but in the context of wider funding scarcity, this is often in competition with programming needs. Sida supports some systems-level learning through its ‘methods support’ budget line and at a programme level has built this into some agreements: under its Strategy for Sustainable Peace it supports several INGOs including the Norwegian Refugee Council for humanitarian mediation programming in CAR, DRC and Mali, and this explicitly includes a learning component which documents the humanitarian-peace nexus. There is scope for this to be more widely replicated.

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To improve learning from programme experience, Sida could:

- Improve knowledge management processes, building on existing internal systems, to enable an overview of potentially connected geographic and thematic programmes, including those working intentionally at the nexus.
- Document, review and share – internally between teams and externally with partners and other donors – the impacts and learning from the existing and recent experience of putting the nexus into practice in different settings.
- Iteratively develop methods for measuring outcomes of intentionally nexus-focused programmes, based on pilots for adaptive programming.
- Support partners to iterate learning by building funded learning components into programme agreements.

4. Organisational structures and systems

4.1 Organisational structures

Lessons: The organisational structure for governing official development assistance (ODA) expenditure in Sweden is not overly complicated and is designed to support the principled separate governance of humanitarian assistance. The division of responsibilities between different headquarters' thematic and geographic teams within the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not present insurmountable obstacles to a joined-up approach but does demand regular communication and routine co-working. The recent creation of a nexus working group within Sida should help to consolidate and develop cross-departmental thinking and action and improve inclusion of the peace leg of the nexus.

Taken to an ultimate conclusion, working towards a coherence model might have radical implications for organisational structure, implying the dissolution of thematic teams and multidisciplinary focus on countries or regions. However, for practical and principled reasons, this is not seen as appropriate for Sweden. Its current – relatively straightforward – organisational structures do not present fundamental obstacles to joint working, beyond the inevitable and surmountable tensions and territorial divisions that any departmental model experiences.

Responsibility for Sweden's ODA is split between several agencies (Appendix 4). The MFA is the ministry with primary responsibility for ODA.[69] It directly manages about a third of this and supervises implementation of the rest by other government agencies – primarily Sida, but with smaller amounts channelled to the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Swedish Institute (which promotes overseas interest in Sweden), the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and Swedfund, the development finance institution. The nexus is relevant to all agencies, but the organisational structures and systems of MFA and Sida are critical as they manage the bulk of development and humanitarian spending, as are those of the FBA, although to a lesser extent, since it informs policy and programming on peace.

Within the MFA, various teams cover areas of work of relevance to the nexus, including the regional departments, which are responsible for the bilateral relations with countries, the UN Policy department, the Department for International Development Cooperation and the Department for Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs. The humanitarian team covers both the international policy processes and relationships with the multilateral organisations which fund core humanitarian support. Connections with counterparts

within Sida on the nexus are not formalised, but communication is regular, as colleagues convene around specific issues, themes and countries. The idea of a more formal cross-team Sida-MFA working group is currently being explored and could be helpful to both make the connections with the MFA's core support to multilaterals and facilitate wider policy coherence.

Within Sida, teams are organised under eight departments: three geographic regions which cover operational programmes, three internal organisational support departments, and two covering policy, innovation and partnerships. Although its remit is global, the Humanitarian Unit is housed in the Asia, Middle East and Humanitarian Assistance department. The senior experts responsible for peace and security are housed in the Department for International Organisations and Policy Support. There is no single locus for development policy or practice as such – this responsibility is shared across all the headquarters' departments. Staff have suggested that this may be part of the reason why nexus coordination is difficult and has tended to default to the humanitarian team: the humanitarian team is a discrete Stockholm-based entity, while development (including peacebuilding) responsibilities are dispersed throughout headquarters, countries and regions.

For specific countries and regions, there appears to be a good level of cross-working between teams, departments and institutions. MFA, FBA and Sida staff meet regularly to share information, meet with geographic departments and take opportunities to consult and involve each other. Joint involvement in the multidimensional poverty analyses and midterm reviews also provides opportunities for travel to field locations. This not only ensures joined-up planning but also fosters communication and shared recognition of risks and vulnerabilities.

Within country teams, Sida's internal evaluation of humanitarian-development interaction noted how important regular country team meetings with compulsory humanitarian attendance are to fostering cooperation. As explained in a later section, this is reliant on having dedicated humanitarian capacity in-country, which is not the case everywhere. One senior manager has also noted how there is still room for improvement in ensuring joint working at a country level, learning from best practice and providing the tools for 'effective teaming'.

Thematically, there have been various attempts to bring staff from different teams together to develop joint thinking and action on the nexus. Within the MFA, there is now an informal working group on the nexus, established in 2018, to collect lessons learned, develop policy and knowledge and actively link to ongoing discussions on the subject with the UN, World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and the EU. Within Sida, a new triple nexus working group has just been established in mid-2019, mandated by the Sida Directors group. This brings together 10 people – two from each operational department, including peace, development and humanitarian specialists and led by the Lead Policy Specialist for Peace and Security. Unlike the previous resilience working group, this seems set up to succeed, drawing authority from the operational guidance, mandate from top leadership and with the potential of further resourcing if required. It is, however, at the time of writing, at a very early stage of defining its workplan and ways of working, and it

remains to be seen how it will balance its efforts between developing and rolling out global guidance, sharing knowledge and experiences and supporting practical experience in the field.

Within the MFA, Sida and the FBA, it appears that more could be done to actively engage coordination with peace colleagues in thematic thinking around the nexus to help move the thinking from the 'double' to the 'triple' nexus. The challenge now is to include the peace perspective and peace staff in a way that builds on the humanitarian-development synergies built to date, and which encourages inclusion of and ownership by all expertise groups. Specifically, within the MFA, the DAC peer review suggests that coordination be increased with the MFA's UN Policy department, the body that manages the contribution to the UN peacebuilding fund, to which Sweden is the largest donor.[70]

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To build on recent efforts to boost communication and collaboration, Sida and the MFA could:

- Create a cross-team Sida-MFA working group to connect their approaches to multilaterals and support wider policy coherence.
- Ensure that peacebuilding colleagues from the MFA's UN Policy department and from the FBA are included in working group initiatives to develop the peace leg of Sweden's nexus approaches.

4.2 Leadership and ownership

Lessons: The senior leadership team at Sida – all of its departmental directors – have communicated a clear steer that working at the nexus is an agency-wide expectation and priority. This should help to continue to shift the perceived centre of nexus gravity from the Humanitarian Unit. Strong country-level leadership remains crucial to enable effective nexus programming and to creatively deploy the full range of 'Team Sweden's' toolkit, including funding allocations, system support and political engagement.

The triple nexus demands clear leadership: a three-fold combination of strong and equal leadership direction from senior management at a global level, active support for a network at the technical level and strong team management at country level. Where there is a lack of explicit ownership and leadership, working-level initiatives may struggle to gain traction and lack incentives for uptake elsewhere.

Historically, there has been a sense that leadership and ownership for the nexus has come from the Humanitarian Unit, as this is where the impetus and initiatives have often come from and where the principled parameters have been set. There is now a clear steer from the highest levels of management that it is a collective responsibility – the directors of all departments have set this as a joint priority for Sida, in keeping with the Policy Framework and the OECD DAC recommendation.

Given the amount of delegated authority given to country directors of development, their leadership is also essential to set the agenda and 'give permission' for joint approaches. As Sida's internal evaluation notes: "in the cases where the most progress has been made, reference is made to the importance that the manager 'dares' to be flexible, understands the issues, is risk-inclined, permissive and prioritises resources for collaboration".[71] Their ability to see opportunities, make connections and promote adaptiveness is critical. For example, the evaluation attributes progress and new approaches in Afghanistan to a new head of team and having staff with both humanitarian and development knowledge. In other cases, staff have noted that conservative country leadership has been a barrier to action.

Engaged country leadership is also necessary for Sida to support and influence other parts of the system. On its own, Sida cannot shift the incentives for change or the centre of funding gravity. Wider system leadership and coordination of the New Way of Working is proving to be patchy, with limitations to buy-in from many quarters and in many countries. Similarly, it appears that Sida's engagement with these in-country structures is dependent on its own staff capacity and interest: in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia, where Sweden has an established presence and strong nexus leadership, it plays an active role in donor groups and coordination discussions and mechanisms. This is, however, discretionary and lacking in other settings and would benefit from a clear Sida and MFA-wide position on Sida's role in the New Way of Working and collective outcomes. In-country engagement may need to call on Sweden's wider political engagement in-country – using the broader toolbox of 'team Sweden' at the embassy and ensuring risk-sensitive policy coherence, particularly when it comes to matters of peace and security.

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To translate the senior leadership steer into consistent country leadership, Sida and the MFA could:

- Embed expectations for risk-sensitivity, cross-disciplinary collaboration and adaptiveness into selection processes, training and performance management of country leadership staff, especially in fragile settings.
- Clarify expectations for country team leaders to engage with country-based efforts to work at the nexus, particularly in New Way of Working pilot countries.

4.3 Staffing and skills

Lessons: The recent recruitment of a new cadre of nexus-focused in-country staff is an important investment in skills and capacity to lead humanitarian-development-peace programme connections. These staff will help often overstretched teams to identify, create and develop opportunities. At the same time, in parallel and in the long-term, skills, knowledge and capacity need to be mainstreamed in all teams and performance management could make it explicit that staff should be working in a connected way.

Generally, Sida's staffing is small in proportion to its ODA spend, and the administration budget has not kept pace with increases in Sida's ODA and spend in fragile states. Sida recently undertook an internal qualitative and quantitative audit of its personnel. Humanitarian staff count, in particular, is out of kilter with spend: 30 staff in Stockholm were directly overseeing the expenditure of over US$443 million. Recent ministerial announcements of increased investments in staffing may go some way to address these issues.[72] Limited capacity can of course have its upsides – as one staff member noted, one benefit of being a small donor with few staff and departments is that it makes coordination much easier. Overall, however, a lack of staff time is a challenge to developing the nexus in theory and in practice.

In-country presence is – as we have seen – critical in ensuring practical connections at the nexus. A growing proportion of MFA and Sida staff is located overseas, rising from 25% in 2013 to 38.5% in 2017. This is part of the decentralised and context-responsive model – a model which, according to the DAC peer review, was "particularly welcome in fragile contexts".[73] The Swedish National Audit Office evaluation noted that officers in embassies had a key role in ensuring the nexus but that staff often had limited time, opportunities and expertise to ensure collaboration. Having humanitarian staff within the in-country team in embassies was seen to be critical to ensure that development approaches included a crisis-risk perspective, as well as consideration of crisis-affected and insecure parts of the country. Managing humanitarian allocations directly from Stockholm allows for an even-handed global process in accordance with humanitarian principles. However, this means that there is not always a dedicated staff member with humanitarian knowledge in the country team and making it the part-time responsibility of a generalist in-country programme officer is often not sufficient.[74]

In answer to these staffing capacity gaps, Sida has taken the bold move to prioritise recruitment of 10 resilience or nexus-focused staff members – new posts created in mid-2019 and deployed to country or regional offices.[75] They have been recruited to bring the skillset, prior expertise and the official job description to be able to support and catalyse work across the nexus.

Recruiting specific nexus roles is an important investment, both for the practical capacity it provides and the signal of intent it delivers. Ultimately, however, making connections to multi-faceted problems should be a natural part of the culture, mindset and approach of all staff. The 2017 internal evaluation concluded that staff understanding of the humanitarian-development nexus varied widely, was very dependent on the individual and therefore needed to be more explicit in all roles and objectives. This goes for all three 'legs' of the nexus and has been particularly noted on the development leg: it noted that development staff need to have competent understanding of humanitarian needs and approaches, as well as of resilience, risk and vulnerability.[76] This needs to be formalised as an expectation, rather than reliant on trickle-down and goodwill: without clear links to objectives and performance management there is no incentive or accountability for staff to think and work in a connected manner.

This needs to be supported and mirrored by staff capacity at the Stockholm level. Sida currently has two Stockholm-based staff who have furthering nexus connections as a major part of their role – one within the Humanitarian Unit, who has recently started, and

one within the Africa team, who makes the connections with the development side and who has proven experience of developing Sida's resilience approach. Both staff are on the newly formed nexus working group, the other members of which also have an – albeit smaller – proportion of their terms of reference dedicated to working at the nexus. Like the group, the exact terms of reference and approach for this staff is yet to be fully defined. There is, however, a high level of momentum, commitment and direction and outputs are being developed quickly.

Suggestions for Sweden as a donor

To complement investment in specific nexus posts, Sida could consider:

- Integrating expectations of cross-disciplinary working in staff performance management.
- Ensuring opportunities for cross-learning between nexus-specific roles and staff movement between countries with different levels of experience.

Appendix 1: Acknowledgements

This report was authored by Sophia Swithern, and reviewed by Sarah Dalrymple, Amy Dodd and Angus Urquhart (DI). The author would like to thank all of the staff at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Folke Bernadotte Academy, both in Stockholm and in regional or country offices, who kindly supported this study, gave generously with their time, and provided expertise, insights and documentation. A full list of these contributors is available in Appendix 3.

We would like to express our gratitude to the Global Humanitarian Assistance programme funders: the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada; the Human Rights, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; and the Department for Humanitarian Action at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.

Appendix 2: Acronyms

FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy
HA	Humanitarian assistance
HCA	Humanitarian crisis analysis
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
RSA	Resilience Systems Analysis
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

Appendix 3: List of interviewees

Elisabet Hedin, Head of Unit, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Frederik Frisell, Humanitarian Assistance Programme Specialist, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Susanne Mikhail, Director of Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Jessica Eliasson, Humanitarian Policy Specialist/Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience, Africa Department, Sida

Hans Magnusson, Director, Africa Department, Sida

Sara Brodd, Programme Specialist, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Sara Ramirez, Desk Officer, Humanitarian Assistance, MFA

Niklas Nordström, Programme Specialist, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Christian Fogelström, Desk Officer, Department for Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA

Petter Meirik, Senior Policy Specialist, Department for International Organisations and Policy Support, Sida

Åsa Wallton, Lead Policy Specialist/Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience, Department for International Organisations and Policy Support, Sida

Camilla Bengtsson, Head of Regional Development Coordination, Sida

Joachim Beijmo, Head of Development Co-operation, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MFA

Mathias Krüger, Programme Officer, Africa Department, Sida

Annika Magnusson, Deputy Director, Prevention, Peacebuilding and Governance, FBA

Göran Holmqvist, Head of Department, Asia, Middle East and Humanitarian Assistance Department, Sida

Michelle Bouchard, Senior Programme Officer/Specialist, Sida

Urban Sjöström, Deputy Director, Department for Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA

Gustav Lindskog, Programme Specialist, Humanitarian Unit, Sida

Anders Öhrström, Former Head of Swedish Development Cooperation in Bangladesh

Appendix 4: Management of Swedish official development assistance



Appendix 5: Dimensions of Swedish development cooperation

- The perspective of the poor on development
- Rights perspective
- Environmental and climate perspective
- Gender equality perspective
- Conflict perspective



Source: Government of Sweden, 2016. Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance: Government Communication 2016/17:60. Available at: https://www.government.se/legal-documents/2017/05/policy-framework-for-swedish-development-cooperation-and-humanitarian-assistance/.

Appendix 6: Portfolio and timing of Sweden's strategies



Note: This diagram is reproduced from Sida, 2019. Operational Plan 2019–2021.

Notes

[1] OECD, 2019. DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. Available at: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf

[2] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[3] Sweden ranked first for policy coherence under the Center for Global Development's Commitment to Development Index.

[4] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[5] Government of Sweden, 2016. Appropriation letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2016.

[6] OECD DAC, Risk and Resilience, http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/risk-resilience/ (accessed 15 October 2019).

[7] Government of Sweden, 2016. Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance: Government Communication 2016/17:60. Available at: https://www.government.se/legal-documents/2017/05/policy-framework-for-swedish-development-cooperation-and-humanitarian-assistance/

[8] Ibid.

[9] This stems from a 2015 government directive in which an integrated conflict perspective was introduced along with gender, environment/climate, poverty and democracy/human rights as factors that should be integrated and used as the departure point for all of Sida's work.

[10] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[11] Sida, 2019. Operational Plan 2019–2021.

[12] Sida, 2017. Strategy for Sweden's humanitarian aid provided through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 2017–2020. Available at: https://www.government.se/494ab9/contentassets/70eebc1992ae40b69318e430c93aefcf/strategy-for-swedens-humanitarian-aid-provided-through-the-swedish-international-development-cooperation-agency-sida-20172020.pdf

[13] Government of Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2017. Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022. Available at: https://www.government.se/490051/globalassets/government/block/fakta-och-genvagsblock/utrikesdepartementet/sanktioner/strategi-hallbar-fred-eng-slutlig.pdf

[14] The Folke Bernadotte Academy is a small Swedish government agency for peace, security and development. It is an implementing, rather than a grant-giving, agency and its activities focus on training, research and guidance on peacebuilding and state-building, as well as recruitment for international peacekeeping and electoral observation missions.

[15] The annual budget for specific peace activities under this strategy was approximately US$43 million in 2019.

[16] Sida, 2017. Strategy for Sweden's humanitarian aid provided through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 2017–2020. Available at: https://www.government.se/494ab9/contentassets/70eebc1992ae40b69318e430c93aefcf/strategy-for-swedens-humanitarian-aid-provided-through-the-swedish-international-development-cooperation-agency-sida-20172020.pdf

[17] Sida, 2017. Peace and conflict tool: Sida's approach to an integrated conflict perspective. Available at: https://www.sida.se/globalassets/sida/eng/partners/peace-and-conflict-tool-box/s209461_tool_integrated_peace_and_conflict_perspective_c3.pdf

[18] This includes in programmes to build peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[19] Sida's working definition of resilience is set out in its 2016 briefing note as "the ability of an individual, a community, a country or a region to anticipate risks, respond and cope with shocks and stresses (both natural and man-made crises) while addressing the underlying root causes of risks, to then recover and continue to develop". It explicitly recognises that this involves addressing people's social systems and their risk landscape and is relevant in conflict contexts as well as in disasters and complex emergencies.

[20] Christoplos I., Novaky M. and Aysan Y., 2012. Resilience, risk and vulnerability at Sida: Final report. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/5de4b5ba77044012af09ba3eb53f3a5f/resilience-risk-and-vulnerability-at-sida---final-report_3406.pdf

[21] Sida, 2018. Draft resilience brief, unpublished.

[22] See MacLeman H., Malik Miller A. and Marty L., 2016. Resilience systems analysis: Learning and recommendations report. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/SwedenLearning_Recommendationsreport.pdf.
The resilience systems analysis (RSA) was piloted in Syria and its neighbouring countries (with a focus on Jordan and Lebanon), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan at various points in the programme cycle.

[23] Government of Sweden, 2016. Appropriation letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2016.

[24] Ibid.

[25] OECD, 2014. Guidelines for resilience systems analysis. How to analyse risk and build a roadmap to resilience. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf

[26] Mowjee T., Poole L., Greenhalgh L. and Gharbi S., 2015. Sida decentralised evaluation 2016:3. Evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/%5Bmowjee-et-al-2016%5D-evaluation-of-sidas-humanitarian-assistance.pdf

[27] Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

[28] Swedish National Audit Office, 2019. Sida's humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation – Prerequisites for collaboration. Available at: https://www.riksrevisionen.se/en/audit-reports/audit-reports/2019/sidas-humanitarian-aid-and-long-term-development-cooperation---prerequisites-for-collaboration.html. At the time of writing (September 2019), Sida was in the process of finalising its response to the Swedish National Audit Office evaluation.

[29] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[30] Sida, 2018. Annex 2 Sahel Initiative. Strategy for Sweden's regional cooperation with Africa 2019–2021.

[31] The regional strategy for sub-Saharan Africa, which has a focus on strengthening regional capacities, has also been recently revised to focus more on preventing recurrent crises in the Horn of Africa.

[32] OECD DAC, Risk and Resilience, http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/risk-resilience/ (accessed 15 October 2019).

[33] See Poole L. and Culbert V., 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf

[34] As one staff member articulated it, under shared resilience goals, 'humanitarian' could support the absorption capacity, and 'development' and 'peace' the adaptive and transformative capacities.

[35] MacLeman H., Malik Miller A. and Marty L., 2016. Resilience systems analysis: Learning and recommendations report. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/SwedenLearning_Recommendationsreport.pdf

[36] The 2017 internal evaluation (Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished) also noted this, citing several conceptual obstacles to joint analysis of risk, targeting and approaches, which would benefit from clarification from Sida's Management Group and the Director-General's Office and could lead to more coherent approaches. These included:

- Identifying shared priority groups: humanitarian and development staff have different interpretations of what "leaving no one behind" and "reaching the furthest behind first" mean. For humanitarian staff, it was based on severity of humanitarian need, for development staff, about poverty metrics.
- Identifying a common level of action: humanitarian and development interventions act at different levels of society – the former at the individual/community level, the latter at the state/systems level.

[37] Swedish National Audit Office, 2019. Sida's humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation – Prerequisites for collaboration. Available at: https://www.riksrevisionen.se/en/audit-reports/audit-reports/2019/sidas-humanitarian-aid-and-long-term-development-cooperation---prerequisites-for-collaboration.html

[38] Poole L. and Culbert V., 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective, p. 19. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf

[39] The full process for humanitarian allocations is as follows: In early November, a global quantitative and indicator-based analysis which compares severity and identifies initial crisis allocation. In mid-November, a qualitative analysis to develop the humanitarian crisis analyses (HCAs) and determine channels and agencies for allocations based on missions and on the UN humanitarian response plans. There is then a wide consultation process with Sida, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and partners ahead of finalising the draft HCAs after the release. In Q1 of the following year, the allocation is confirmed and disbursed, and the direction is summarised in a Humanitarian Outlook document.

[40] Government of Sweden, 2016. Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance: Government Communication 2016/17:60. Available at: https://www.government.se/legal-documents/2017/05/policy-framework-for-swedish-development-cooperation-and-humanitarian-assistance/

[41] Sida, 2017. Poverty toolbox: MDPA Poverty analysis, p.5. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/4ecfd42348644d32abbfdccbed6f15c0/mdpa_poverty_analysis.pdf.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Sida, 2017. Dimensions of Poverty: Sida's conceptual framework. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/f3e30b6727e8450887950edb891c05af/22161.pdf

[44] Sida, 2017. Poverty toolbox: MDPA Poverty analysis, p.3 and p.6. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/4ecfd42348644d32abbfdccbed6f15c0/mdpa_poverty_analysis.pdf and MacLeman H., Malik Miller A. and Marty L., 2016. Resilience systems analysis: Learning and recommendations report. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/SwedenLearning_Recommendationsreport.pdf

[45] Ibid. and OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[46] Poole L. and Culbert V., 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf

[47] Sida, 2015. Humanitarian Operational Guidance: Internal operational guidelines for Sida's Humanitarian Unit.

[48] Sida, 2016. Designing relief and development to enhance resilience and impact.

[49] Sida, 2019. Humanitarian outlook and Sida's humanitarian response 2019. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/5fe727b984624944acdfaa0d5d5ca0dd/humanitarian_outlook_and_sidas_humanitarian_response_2019_-_allocation_methodology_criteria_and_outcome_feb._2019_final.pdf

[50] The Folke Bernadotte Academy conducts training, research and method development to strengthen peacebuilding and state-building in conflict and post-conflict states. It also recruits civilian staff for multilateral peace operations and election observation missions.

[51] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[52] In 2019, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) allocated funding to seven agencies and to the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as follows: CERF: US$75 million; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): US$10 million; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC): US$8 million; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA): US$19 million; United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR): US$4 million; United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR): US$93 million; United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): US$50 million; World Food Programme (WFP): US$82 million.

[53] For 2019, Sida's total humanitarian budget was US$443 million.

[54] Mowjee T., Poole L., Greenhalgh L. and Gharbi S., 2015. Sida decentralised evaluation 2016:3. Evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/%5Bmowjee-et-al-2016%5D-evaluation-of-sidas-humanitarian-assistance.pdf

[55] Sida, 2018. Grand Bargain in 2018: Annual self-report – Narrative summary. Available at https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/sweden_-_narrative_summary.pdf

[56] Sida, 2019. Humanitarian outlook and Sida's humanitarian response 2019. Available at: https://www.sida.se/contentassets/5fe727b984624944acdfaa0d5d5ca0dd/humanitarian_outlook_and_sidas_humanitarian_response_2019_-_allocation_methodology_criteria_and_outcome_feb._2019_final.pdf

[57] Poole L. and Culbert V., 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf

[58] Swedish National Audit Office, 2019. Sida's humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation – Prerequisites for collaboration. Available at: https://www.riksrevisionen.se/en/audit-reports/audit-reports/2019/sidas-humanitarian-aid-and-long-term-development-cooperation---prerequisites-for-collaboration.html

[59] OECD, 2019. DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. Available at: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf

[60] Sida, 2018. Non-paper: Sida contribution to Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Available at: www.globalcrrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FINAL-SIDA-PAPPER-Sida-contriubtion-CRRF-20180829.pdf

[61] Sida, 2018. NGO guidelines: For non-governmental strategic partner organisations to the Humanitarian Unit at Sida.

[62] Sida, 2019. Partnership dialogue on humanitarian/development nexus at Sida Partnership Forum, https://www.anpdm.com/newsletterweb/454A5E437348415E4B70494759/4347504076464A50417048415B4371 (accessed 15 October 2019).

[63] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[64] Ibid.; and, Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

[65] Although this does happen in some areas: under the Sustainable Peace strategy, the Peace and Human Security Unit has shared a list of all programmes and which countries receive support with the embassies and geographical units.

[66] Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

[67] MacLeman H., Malik Miller A. and Marty L., 2016. Resilience systems analysis: Learning and recommendations report. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/SwedenLearning_Recommendationsreport.pdf

[68] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[69] In 2017, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was responsible for 78% of Sweden's official development assistance – the other 22% comprised funding spend within Sweden on refugee hosting costs, as well as EU development assistance funded by the EU membership fee.

[70] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[71] Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

[72] In September 2019, the development minister announced this and an increase to Sida's administrative budget of US$19 million in 2020.

[73] OECD, 2019. OECD development co-operation peer reviews: Sweden 2019. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-sweden-2019_9f83244b-en#page1

[74] Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

[75] These posts are deployed to cover Bangladesh, Burkina Faso/Sahel, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Jordan, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

[76] Sida, 2017. Internal evaluation: Interaction between humanitarian aid and development cooperation – From operating plan prioritisation to practice, unpublished.

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