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Vulnerability and resilience: How does Uganda's data ecosystem inform social protection systems?

report

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Acronyms

EOC	Equal Opportunities Commission
MDAs	ministries, departments and agencies
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
HSP	Ministry of Health Strategic Plan (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25)
MIS	management information system
NAP	National Action Plan III on Women, Peace and Security (2021–2025)
NIN	National Identification Number
NIRA	National Identification and Registration Authority
NSPP	National Social Protection Policy (2015)
NSR	National Single Registry
NSS	National Statistical System
PNSD	Third Plan for National Statistical Development (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25)
SCG	Senior Citizens Grant
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UNIDSR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

Overview

The promise to leave no one behind (LNOB) is central to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its aim to tackle poverty in all forms. As part of the LNOB commitment, UN member states are compelled to consider those being left behind first, and to tackle the discrimination and exclusion that lead to inequality.

Development Initiatives (DI) has produced a series of LNOB assessments – in [Benin](#), [Kenya](#) and two municipalities in Nepal, [Simta](#) and [Tulsipur](#). We worked with local partners to identify and develop the focus of each paper. DI has also published reports looking at [aid effectiveness in Uganda](#), and [Uganda's aid information management platform](#).

This particular report is a data landscaping assessment. It examines the vulnerability and resilience data landscape in Uganda, and was carried out against a background of dynamic and, at times, volatile poverty and wellbeing outcomes. Individuals and communities can move in and out of poverty due to slow incremental changes, or sudden shocks or crises. Shock-responsive social protection systems and other interventions can help to secure vulnerable groups and people, but only if they are successfully managed and targeted.

The report aims to understand the data ecosystem that informs responsive social protection systems, and provide evidence-informed policy recommendations on how it can be strengthened. This information can be leveraged by the Ugandan Government, civil society and development partners.

[Part 1](#) of this report describes the number of relevant data sources identified by the study team, and the quantity and quality of that data. It also provides case studies on the National Single Registry, the national ID system, and civil registration and vital statistics. [Part 2](#) describes how this data is used in Uganda, and [Part 3](#) reviews the governance and management of data systems and data use. [Part 4](#) documents top-level policy recommendations.

Executive summary

Leaving no one behind (LNOB) is the core promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It compels development actors to consider the furthest behind first and to tackle the discrimination and exclusion that lead to inequality. Development Initiatives has produced several LNOB assessments through our Poverty & Inequality programme to address data and information needs of our partners and allies.

This assessment examines the vulnerability and resilience data landscape in Uganda, and recognises the dynamic and often volatile nature of poverty and wellbeing outcomes in the country. It aims to assess the data ecosystem that is related to people and their changing needs, focusing on different factors associated with their vulnerability and resilience. This information can be leveraged by the Ugandan Government, civil society and development partners to strengthen responsive social protection systems and other similar interventions associated with vulnerability and/or resilience.

Key findings

Data sources and systems

- A total of 56 data sources and 40 data systems measuring people's vulnerability and resilience were identified for the period from 2013 to 2023.
- Most of Uganda's official data sources and systems are quantitative, while more than half of non-official data sources/systems are qualitative.
- The majority (58%) of the identified data sources/systems are "one-offs" which enable a single snapshot limited to a restricted period.
- Less than one-third (23) of the identified sources/systems produce widely accessible data that is disaggregated below the district level.
- The majority (70%) of the identified data sources/systems are non-official and are focused on small geographic areas (for example, on one or perhaps two sub-counties).
- Data disaggregation is still a challenge – about half (47) of the identified data sources/systems had data disaggregated by gender; 37 had data disaggregated by age; and only 23 produce data that is disaggregated by disability type.
- Uganda's Data Protection and Privacy Act (2019) makes provisions for how sensitive data should be handled properly. Stakeholders involved in any step of a data lifecycle when the subjects are vulnerable individuals and/or groups need to be trained in how to apply its principles.
- Data access is still a general problem in Uganda. Many of the actors that we spoke to said that the biggest problem is the inability to access microdata.

Key systems case studies

'Key systems' here refers to the National Single Registry (NSR), national IDs and civil registration and vital statistics.

- Effective stakeholder coordination is a key element in the production, sharing and use of data on vulnerability and resilience. The NSR is an important intervention that resulted from policy being enacted and well-coordinated stakeholder cooperation. However, the system in its current form cannot help the government to better target beneficiaries of social protection programmes. Challenges remain in how to keep the data up to date and how to build capacities in local governments.
- Uganda now uses the national ID system as the sole tool for enrolment of beneficiaries into social protection programmes. However, some major problems persist with the use of national IDs in social protection programmes. For example, around 43,000 national ID cards have the wrong data on them, which government officials we spoke to believe is the “biggest problem”.
- Uganda has embraced the use of vital statistics, however, these cannot be used to monitor real-time changes, or to guide stakeholders' responses to unfolding situations. This is because vital statistics are not produced using data from the civil registration system. Only 32% of births and 23% of deaths are registered in Uganda, and there are some data gaps in the information collected by the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) (such as place of birth and mothers' details). Interviewees explained that death registration is the biggest problem, claiming that in some cases there are actually incentives not to register deaths.

Data use

- There is a culture of limited data use in Uganda especially among those institutions and individuals working to reduce people's vulnerability and increase their resilience. Of these, there are generally two categories:
 - Those that have no interest in using data:
 - A culture of data use is not embedded in many government and non-government organisations. Some actors stick to different ways of working, some actors are motivated by priorities other than evidence, some actors assume useful data is not available, and some actors are sceptical about the accuracy of the data.
 - Those that want to use data but cannot:
 - Actors' data needs are not met. For example, the data that they might want – such as data on indicators, geographic locations, time series or disaggregation – does not exist. Many actors do not have the specialised skill set, time and/or resources to fully utilise the data available to them. The pool of data that actors are prepared to select from is limited, as they are hesitant to use data which is not produced by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). The unavailability of microdata severely curtails what insight users can create for themselves.

Data governance and management

- There is evidence of effective cooperation leading to desirable results in Uganda's vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem. However, these instances are embedded in a data ecosystem that is more often characterised by a disconnect, for example.
 - While UBOS is mandated to coordinate government-wide data collection, many stakeholders think the agency can do better as it has struggled to bring other agencies into the national statistical system (NSS).
 - No government agency is mandated to coordinate data management, and the void created means it is largely unattended to.
- There is also a lack of harmony in donors' work in the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem. Most donors operate in silos to gatekeep their priority areas and pursue the interests of their countries' governments.
- Uganda's vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem faces a major financing problem. There is not enough funding for data activities, especially at the sub-national level. Much of the funding that does exist primarily comes from donors, with the two main consequences of this being that:
 - National interests are compromised as donors have a powerful say in what work is done; and
 - Sustainability is undermined as donor funding cycles are relatively short-term and can be susceptible to change.
- Uganda has high-quality policies relevant to the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem. Examples include the National Social Protection Policy (2015) and the National Action Plan III on Women, Peace and Security (2021–2025) (NAP). These provide proper guidance for clear targeting, delegate roles and responsibilities, include costs, and sections on monitoring and evaluation.
- There is limited awareness among stakeholders of the existing policy frameworks for vulnerability and resilience data in Uganda. Interviewees had very little knowledge about what the policies aimed to achieve specifically, or of how it was proposed those aims would be achieved.

Introduction

Background

Leave no one behind (LNOB) is the central transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It compels development actors to consider the furthest behind first and to tackle the discrimination and exclusion that cause inequalities. Through the Poverty & Inequality programme, DI has produced LNOB assessments that meet the needs of our partners and allies. DI completed four assessments in 2022/2023 – in Benin, Kenya and two in Nepal. Each had a different focus that was identified and developed with local partners.

Framing the study in Uganda

Poverty and wellbeing outcomes in Uganda are dynamic, and at times extremely volatile; individuals and communities can move in and out of poverty due to slow incremental changes, or sudden shocks or crises. The Covid-19 pandemic was one such crisis that resulted in a sudden increase in poverty in the country.¹ Shock-responsive social protection systems and other humanitarian, insurance and welfare interventions can help to secure vulnerable groups and people, but only if they are successfully managed and targeted. During the pandemic, extra resources were allocated towards supporting vulnerable people. However, there was insufficient data and evidence to identify the most vulnerable and appropriately allocate these resources.

Data landscaping and the study's objective

LNOB assessments are split into two parts: 1) data landscaping; and 2) data analysis. This report is the data landscaping section of this LNOB assessment. Data landscaping is the systematic analysis of data ecosystems. A data ecosystem consists of data sources and systems, data use and the governance and management of data. The primary objective of data landscaping is to contribute towards the strengthening of data ecosystems, by a) providing an evaluation of the composite factors and b) providing evidence-informed policy recommendations on how these factors can be strengthened.

The main objective of this data landscaping study is to:

- Understand the data ecosystem that informs responsive social protection systems and other similar interventions that aim to minimise the impact of changes in people's vulnerability and/or resilience (see Box 1 for an explanation of vulnerability and resilience).

Approach and methodology

DI held an inception workshop in Kampala in December 2022, which served as the platform for the study's co-creation. The workshop was attended by representatives from government, donors, academia, and civil society organisations.² The stakeholders identified the priority research objective and discussed the methodological approach. Based on this, DI adapted our general analytical framework for data landscaping (see Table 1 for the four key resources included in our data landscaping toolkit). The team then conducted a desk-based review of grey literature and face-to-face key informant interviews (KIIs) between February and March 2023.³ Finally, DI held a virtual validation workshop in August 2023.

Table 1. The key resources in DI's data landscaping toolkit

Name of resource	Description
Desk research checklist	List of actions, key variables, and evaluative criteria, organised around three thematic areas: data systems; data use; and data governance.
Questionnaire for KIIs	26 standard questions organised around three thematic areas: data systems; data use; and data governance.
Data inventory	Excel-based table consisting of 22 fields to record identified systems (e.g., censuses, surveys, management information systems, etc.), capture vital metadata and map data flows.
Findings matrix	Excel-based template consisting of flexible criteria to generate evidence-based analytical points.

Structure of the report

[Part 1](#) of this report describes the quantity and quality of data included in the data inventory, in addition to case studies on the NSR, the national ID system, and civil registration and vital statistics.⁴ [Part 2](#) describes how this data is used in Uganda, and [Part 3](#) reviews the governance and management of data systems and data use. [Part 4](#) documents top-level policy recommendations based on evidence from Parts 1–3.

Box 1: Understanding vulnerability and resilience

Vulnerability and resilience are interrelated concepts. Our understanding of the two concepts lends from definitions put forward by the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNDRR) and UNICEF below.

According to the UNISDR, vulnerability is the “conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards”.⁵ Vulnerability thus depends on several factors, including people's state of health, poverty and inequality, social status, disability and age, poor environmental management, climate change, the quality and state of local infrastructure, their location with respect to hazards, access to information, and awareness about potential risks, shocks, and hazards.⁶

Resilience refers to the ability of individuals and communities to withstand threats or shocks, or their ability to adapt to new livelihood options, in ways that preserve integrity and that do not deepen existing vulnerability. For a household, resilience is related to resources such as income, human capital and the social resources at its disposal. Resilience also depends on the household's ability to use these resources, for example, whether it has access to markets, public services and social protection services.⁷

Part 1 – Uganda’s vulnerability and resilience data inventory

Part 1.1 – Existing data sources and systems

The study team identified 56 relevant data sources that were published in the last decade (i.e., since 2013). ‘Data sources’ are single datasets produced by single data collection exercises. For example, the National Labour Force Surveys carried out in 2018 and 2021 count as two sources. The study team also identified 40 data systems that have produced relevant data over the last decade. ‘Data systems’ refer to a single system that produces data continually or at relatively frequent intervals, for example, the health management information system counts as one system.⁸

Table 2. Number and type of data sources and data systems


Type of source	Number of data sources
Official census	1
Official survey	29
Non-official survey	8
Mixed official ⁹	1
Non-official qualitative	7
Non-official quantitative and qualitative ¹⁰	10
Total	56

Type of system	Number of data systems
Official administrative	36
Official Geographic Information System	1
Non-official administrative	3
Total	40

Source: Development Initiatives based on study findings.

Official data sources/systems are overwhelmingly quantitative (see Figure 1).


Figure 1. Official data sources and data systems by type of source/system



Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Over half of non-official data sources/systems are qualitative (see Figure 2).¹¹

Figure 2. Non-official data sources and data systems by type of source/system



Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Qualitative research can help to explain quantitative findings, and quantitative data can test qualitative findings. Therefore, it is ideal if qualitative and quantitative data sources and systems overlap. However, in this ecosystem, the two types of data generally do not overlap. For example, 15 quantitative data sources and systems produced data on health but only three qualitative data sources and systems did. Moreover, the response to Covid-19 in Pallisa District accounted for two of the qualitative data sources/systems,

therefore there is even less overlap with the quantitative data sources and systems which are mostly national in scope.

The study team could only find complete information – that is, for all the fields in our inventory – for 57 data sources and systems. These sources and systems therefore provide the sample for the following analysis.

Table 3. Identified data systems by type

Type of source	Number of sources
Official census data	1
Official survey data	23
Mixed official	1
Non-official survey data	6
Non-official qualitative data	7
Non-official quantitative and qualitative data	10
Total	48

Type of systems	Number of systems
Official administrative data	7
Non-official administrative data	2
Total	9

Source: Development Initiatives based on study findings.

The identified data sources and systems have produced an array of data that measures vulnerability and resilience, including information specifically related to social protection programmes and other similar interventions.¹² See Table 4 for examples.

Table 4. Examples of relevant indicators by theme and data source

Example indicator	Example theme	Example source
Distribution of persons in paid employment by type of social security and selected background characteristics.	Social protection	National Labour Force Survey
Percentage of children under age 5 whose births are registered with the civil authorities, according to background characteristics.	Civil registration	Demographic Health Survey
Possession of National identity card.	National identification	National Service Delivery Survey
Percentage of agricultural households that received extension services in the previous 12 months.	Agriculture	Annual Agricultural Survey
Persons with disabilities aged 18 years and above with access to social transfers.	Disability	Functional Difficulties Survey
Geographical distribution of orphans and vulnerable children served per district in the country.	Orphans and vulnerable children	Orphans and Vulnerable Children Management Information System
Percentage distribution of persons in vulnerable employment by selected background characteristics.	Economy	National Labour Force Survey
Availability of food stock at households and projected duration.	Food security	Situation of Food Security and Nutrition in Northern Uganda
Electricity reliability by background characteristics.	Service delivery	National Service Delivery Survey
Percentage of women that have ever been physically abused who had knowledge and use of services.	Violence against children and women	National Survey on Violence in Uganda
Ownership of insecticide-treated nets by wealth.	Health	Malaria Indicator Survey

Example indicator	Example theme	Example source
Literate persons aged 18 years and above for selected characteristics and sex.	Education	National Household Survey
Perception by respondents and extent to which public security forces are involved in corruption by sex and residence.	Peace and security	National Governance Peace and Security Survey
Distribution of women and men in local government councils.	Political participation	Women in Local Government

Source: Development Initiatives based on study findings.

Disaggregation

In order to inform a leave-no-one-behind approach, it is necessary to identify individual and group-based characteristics that may influence poverty outcomes. To enable this, data must capture variables relating to multiple dimensions of vulnerability/resilience, such as asset ownership or access to social protection, but also include variables that can allow for disaggregation by characteristics that may be associated with inequality and exclusion within a population, such as gender, age or geography.

Group-based disaggregation


Data disaggregated by gender is produced by 47 of the identified data sources and systems. This high number is testament to the success of efforts to mainstream the collection of gender-disaggregated data in Uganda. Such efforts include UBOS's Strategy for the Development of Gender Statistics¹³ and National Priority Gender Equality Indicators Framework,¹⁴ as well as the repeated inclusion of strategic objectives to improve disaggregation by gender in multiple National Statistical Development Plans.¹⁵

Data disaggregated by age is produced by 37 of the data sources and systems. While not as high a number as gender, it is still significant in representing over half of the identified data sources and systems, indicating that efforts to mainstream the collection of age-disaggregated data in Uganda are underway. However, in the data sources and systems that do produce data disaggregated by age, age groupings are usually large (e.g., "over 18 years"). The lack of granularity means the usefulness of age-disaggregated data is limited.

Conversely, only 23 of the data sources and systems produce data that is disaggregated by (type of) disability. This represents around 40% of the identified data systems. This means a majority of the identified data systems cannot be used by actors interested in issues that impact persons with disabilities. As a consequence, the range of evidence these actors can draw from is limited.¹⁶

The type of disaggregated data least collected is ‘ethnicity’ (or ‘tribe’). This data is only collected by four of the data sources and systems. Interviewees reported several reasons why this is the case. For example, powerful groups that want to avoid highlighting disparities to protect their privilege, and some minority groups that prefer not to give information due to a fear of potential repercussions. These are factors that combine to cause what is, in essence, a ‘culture of silence’. This means that actors interested in issues that impact different ethnic groups have barely any evidence to use.

Figure 3. Types of disaggregation by number of data sources/systems




Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Geographic disaggregation

Geographic disaggregation plays a significant part in determining how useful a dataset is to an actor. It is generally accepted that for data to be useful it needs to be disaggregated to at least one administrative tier below where it is being used. For example, someone at the national level needs data disaggregated by region and/or below; someone at the regional level needs data disaggregated by sub-region and/or below, and so on. This is so actors can allocate funding, design and provide services, make policy and so on tailored to the needs of their jurisdiction.

‘Localisation’, if inclusive, has the potential to significantly contribute towards LNOB.¹⁷ DI generally considers the ‘local level’ to be the lowest administrative tier in a country that has significant decision-making power and/or responsibility for policymaking and/or service delivery. In Uganda, this would be at the district level. Only 23 of the identified data sources and systems produce data disaggregated below the district level (approximately 40%).¹⁸ Of these, 16 are non-official and because non-official data sources and systems are usually concerned with specific areas, for example, one or perhaps two sub-counties, their usefulness is severely limited. In other words, many districts have very limited, if any data to work with.

Figure 4. Number of data sources/systems by geographic disaggregation and type




Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Frequency

There was a spike in the publication of data in 2020 (see Figure 5), but this was not directly related to Covid-19 as only three of the 17 datasets are about the pandemic. Instead, the rise was caused by a seemingly coincidental flurry of non-official publications covering an array of thematic focuses. For example, female political participation, the quality of tuberculosis services, and the economic inclusion of persons with disabilities.¹⁹

Figure 5. Number of datasets published per year



Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Timeliness

Stakeholders can respond to what are often rapidly changing circumstances if data is collected frequently and made available quickly. Advanced administrative data systems have this capability, such as the health management information system which runs through the District Health Information System 2 software. However, data from these types of systems is only accessible to officials with login credentials, which means the majority of stakeholders cannot use it to respond to unfolding situations.


There is an inevitable delay between data being collected by household surveys, censuses, and qualitative studies and it being made available for use. In this sample, there is a mean of just over a year between data collection starting and publication. Although in some instances the gap is smaller. For example, UBOS and UNWOMEN published data from the Covid-19 Rapid Gender Assessment Survey roughly seven months after it had been collected. Delays mean these types of data sources and systems are not directly useful for actors responding to rapidly changing circumstances. Nevertheless, they are still very important because the data they produce is of a higher quality and can be used to make administrative information more meaningful.

On average it takes longer for official data to be made available than non-official data. Contributing factors include official data sources and systems having more indicators, greater sample sizes, and covering larger geographic areas.

Mode of collection

The mode of collection refers to whether data collection is completed face-to-face or remotely and with the use of technology or not. For sources and systems where mode of data collection was specified, data for at least 65% of the data sources and systems was collected face-to-face. The benefits of face-to-face data collection include being able to reach some vulnerable groups that may be excluded when data is collected remotely (for example, elderly people who are less likely to have access to required technology) and a reduced risk of response bias (which is higher when data is collected remotely).²⁰ However, face-to-face data collection is generally more expensive, and can pose security risks in dangerous contexts. No security problems were recorded during any of the collection exercises included in the sample this analysis is based on.²¹ Over half (62%) of the data sources and systems where the mode of collection was specified were collected with the use of technology.²² Using technology to collect data can increase the efficiency of the process and can increase the quality of the data as it can reduce the likelihood of human errors being made.

Figure 6. Mode of data collection by percentage of sources/systems²³



Source: Development Initiatives, 2023.

Part 1.2 – The National Single Registry and the need for a National Social Registry

The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD) launched a digital NSR in February 2021.²⁴ Among other objectives, the MoGLSD wants to use the NSR to facilitate the harmonisation of siloed social protection programmes.

The NSR is linked to management information systems (MIS) embedded in national social protection systems, which collect data during beneficiary registration and from the point of service delivery, and include:

- The Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment MIS
- The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund MIS
- The Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children MIS
- The Uganda Child Helpline MIS
- The National ID Database
- The Youth Livelihood Programme MIS
- The Disability Grant MIS
- The Development Response to Displacement Impact Project MIS

The MoGLSD confirmed that its long-term goal is to connect all MISs that collect data on social protection and other complimentary services to the NSR. Hence, it aims to connect the National Social Security Fund MIS and National Gender-Based Violence MIS soon. It

also aims to connect a Public Service Extension MIS when it is ready (it is being built now), in addition to any new MISs if they are established (for example, a proposed National Health Insurance MIS).²⁵

Interviewees said that for the NSR to achieve a more advanced functionality, connecting MISs to it needs to be complemented by the implementation of standardised classifications within the different MISs it brings together. For example, the geocoding used by different MISs varies at the moment and needs to be aligned so the different data they produce can be used together.

The NSR has a public dashboard through which any user can access aggregated data, some of which can be disaggregated by programme, district, gender and year. Users with login credentials can automatically access microdata, however other users have to make requests via the portal.²⁶ Therefore, while the NSR does promote data availability for a subset of mainly MoGLSD staff, it does not markedly increase the availability of data for the larger proportion of other potential users.

Arguably the most important lessons from the establishment of the NSR are that it has shown that:

1. Policy can be an effective catalyst of action.
2. Significant developments can be achieved when cooperation is well coordinated between stakeholders.

The objective to implement an NSR was initially formalised in the National Social Protection Policy (2015) (NSPP). When talking about the NSR actors routinely acknowledge this, as well as the importance it had in driving its implementation.

The establishment of the NSR also hinged on a) clear leadership by the MoGLSD and a 'dedicated unit' from the Expanding Social Protection Secretariat, and b) the willing participation of members of a cross-ministerial Steering Committee, including representatives from the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, the National Information Technology Authority, the Office of the Prime Minister, NIRA, the Ministry of Local Government, and development partners.²⁷

However, in its current state, the NSR does have a significant flaw; its inability to help the government better target beneficiaries of social protection programmes. In response to this need, numerous voices called for the development of a social registry module to be added to the NSR. For example, in April 2023 the Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER) said:

“Social registers are information systems that aid in the registration and determination of possible eligibility for social programs. ISER affirms the need for a comprehensive social register”.²⁸

ISER, 2023

This endorsement was echoed by the State Minister for Disability Affairs, Asamo Hellen Grace. In May 2023 she publicly stated that Uganda “need[s] to fast-track the upgrading of the social registry module of the [NSR] to facilitate beneficiary targeting”.²⁹

Interviewees told us that demand for the implementation of a social registry was ramped up because of how chronic shortfalls in the current way of working became emphasised during the Covid-19 pandemic, in addition to stakeholders looking to other countries and learning about the benefits of their social registries.

In May 2023, the Government of Uganda stated in the Stakeholder Engagement Plan for the National Uganda Social Action Fund Project that it would “support the operationalization of a dynamic national social registry”.³⁰ Since this declaration it has begun work on the social registry.^{31, 32}

The MoGLSD has already conducted a feasibility study. Officials visited Pakistan and plans to visit Kenya in month (May, 2024) to study their social registries, and to observe first-hand how these countries’ systems operate.³³ Additionally, early development work is well underway, with support from the World Bank. Particular data fields are still not fully decided on, but stakeholders are aiming for the social registry to produce highly disaggregated data.^{34, 35}

Looking forward, the actors we interviewed say the two most significant challenges they foresee in the long-term implementation of the social registry are:

1. Keeping the data up to date.
2. Building capacities in local governments.

As things stand both of these problems remain unsolved, even theoretically. However, officials have turned their attention to them. Interviewees reported they are exploring the option of implementing mobile data capture at the local level to facilitate frequent data collection. They are also thinking about ways to generate core funding from the central government to provide a pipeline to strengthen the resources available to local administrations.

Part 1.3 – Is National ID a hindrance or helpful?

In Uganda, as is the case in many places around the world, national ID cards and national identification numbers (NINs) are used to administer social protection transfers. Theoretically, their application is supposed to upgrade the systems by making them more efficient for the government and individual recipients. In Uganda, though, many stakeholders are questioning the functionality of theirs. For example, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, ISER and The Unwanted Witness joined forces and authored a report (2021) which presented a damning indictment of the system.³⁶ In it, it is argued that because vulnerable groups are disproportionately excluded from obtaining national IDs (and therefore NINs), they are disproportionately excluded from accessing social protection programmes.

“Ndaga Muntu [Uganda’s national ID system] has led to mass exclusion, shutting out as many as one third of Uganda’s adult population, and has become a barrier for women and older persons, as well as many other marginalized individuals, to access their human rights [to health and social security].”³⁷

The reasons for this vary depending on the social protection programme in question. However, by looking at the Senior Citizens Grant (SCG) it is possible to glean some generally applicable insight.

To access their payments recipients must physically present their ID card (along with their NIN) to officials at payment points.³⁸ However, many older people do not have a national ID card or NIN, and therefore cannot receive their SCG. There are a number of obstacles blocking older people from obtaining national IDs, including them not being able to prove an exact date of birth, being unable to present documented proof of citizenship, illiteracy, making form-filling impossible and equipment not being able to record worn fingerprints.

Government officials we spoke to agree with some of the points raised in the report. They acknowledged that “not everyone has an ID”, estimating that around 10,000 older people currently do not have one. They also acknowledged the “bigger problem” that many national ID cards, around 43,000, have the wrong data on them (for example, date of birth being too recent, so someone who is 80 and is therefore eligible for the SCG, is recorded as being 60 and therefore cannot access their payments).

Officials emphasised however, that while the previous system was mistake-laden, being based on a multitude of paper documents, the national ID system is in its nascent stage and still needs time to develop fully.

Some recent developments have also set a precedent that means there is reason to believe the national ID system can advance closer to where it needs to be. For example, one of the main reasons given in the report as to why older and other marginalised people cannot register for a national ID is NIRA’s use of mass registration drives rather than a continuous enrolment model. However, since the report was published NIRA has made the switch to the latter from the former. Moreover, NIRA has expanded the coverage of its offices and personnel, provided more technical infrastructure, increased the level of outreach it conducts (including through strengthened partnerships with departments that administer social protection), and has made strategic adjustments to the system with a view to future long-term gains (for example, infants are now designated a NIN when their birth is registered, which they will be able to make use of when they are 18 years old).

However, this is not to say that all improvements are a foregone conclusion. One of the flagship advances NIRA is currently touting is its planned upgrading of national ID cards from 1st to 2nd generation ones in 2024, about which the Auditor General commented:

“NIRA [has] no clear plan on when the new IDs will be rolled out, the costs involved, sensitisation arrangements of the public were also not clear and other key activities such as signing of contracts for supply of the blank cards, procurement of equipment and recruitment of staff to manage the exercise were yet to be undertaken.”³⁹

An official we spoke to explained:

“The new ID cards will collect biometric information in the form of fingerprints and iris scans. However, there is a sizeable portion of people with disabilities, amputees for example, who it is not possible to collect this kind of information from. We need to think about this and make additions accordingly.”

Part 1.4 – Getting CRVS right is critical for Uganda’s vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem

Civil registration and vital statistics incorporates data systems which support the provision of and access to social protection services, in addition to facilitating protection from a number of harmful practices (for example, child marriage, child labour, and trafficking).⁴⁰ The vital statistics produced from civil registration data can also be an important source of up-to-date information, which are near real-time in advanced statistical systems. Specifically, they can help governments and other actors to “understand population dynamics” and to “assess levels of inequality”.⁴¹

However, in Uganda, vital statistics are not produced using data from civil registration systems.⁴² Instead, “UBOS collects, compiles and disseminates vital statistics from decennial population censuses and household surveys such as the Demographic and Health Survey every 5-years or so”.⁴³ As people are at risk of suffering sudden shocks, the government and other actors cannot use these vital statistics to monitor real-time changes or, therefore, to guide their responses to unfolding situations.

Reasons why vital statistics are not calculated using civil registration data might be because only 32% of births and 23% of deaths are registered in the country.^{44, 45} In addition, there are a number of data gaps in the information collected by NIRA (for example, places of birth and mothers’ details).⁴⁶ Interviewees explained that the lack of death registration is the biggest problem, and claimed that in some cases there are actually incentives not to register deaths. However, the combination of the need for a national ID to claim social protection and the requirement that individual beneficiaries physically attend distribution points should close some of these loopholes.

Part 2 – Access and use of vulnerability and resilience data in Uganda

2.1 Access

Open data allows evidence to be used and reused and can contribute to reduced duplication and increased harmonisation of data and programmes alike. In Uganda, accessing data, especially microdata, is a big problem. Any ability to access information normally mirrors the extent of social connectedness, as actors tend to use their connections to informally access information instead of through established data sharing/open data protocols.

“Makerere University recently completed a study on vulnerability and equity in service delivery in Uganda, but one needs to be part of their network to access the data and information”.

Key informant interviewee

Factors that contribute to the reluctance to share data include:

- No culture of collaboration and openness when it comes to data.
- A lack of trust between organisations, especially when there is competition or rivalry between them.
- Organisations considering their data to be a potential source of revenue and not sharing it without a clear business case.
- A belief that data breaches or cyberattacks are more likely if data is shared, especially when robust cybersecurity measures are not in place.
- A lack of clear policies and procedures for sharing data responsibly, which feeds into concerns about violating privacy regulations and/or exposing sensitive information.
- Insufficient technological infrastructure, for example, data management systems, which makes it challenging to share data effectively and securely.
- The data’s usefulness being undervalued because of concerns about its quality, including the lack of standardised formats.
- Regulatory barriers impeding data sharing, particularly when the data is sensitive.

The study team gathered some experiences of people when trying to access information, for example:

“UBOS bureaucracy is not good when it comes to data sharing. For example, a person asks for data from the Department of Social Statistics, this department then asks another department to clean and anonymise the data, that department replies saying it is not a priority, and so on. In the end, the user who requested the data ends up giving up on his or her request”.

2.2 Data use

Interviewees report that the use of data within the vulnerability and resilience space in Uganda is weak. First and foremost, many government and non-governmental organisations do not have a culture of data use. In other words, people do not refer to evidence while making policy, designing and administering services, monitoring programmes, carrying out advocacy work and so on.

There are many reasons why this is the case, including actors sticking to different ways of working, actors being motivated by priorities other than evidence, and actors assuming useful data is not available. Some potential users are also sceptical about the accuracy of the data in the space; in their eyes data that shines a light on deprivations, marginalisation and so forth highlights government failures, which they believe makes producing this kind of data politically inexpedient. They therefore believe, justifiably or not, that the data there is has been ‘massaged’. This means these potential users prefer not to use the data.

On the other hand, using data can be difficult for the actors who do attempt to work with evidence. It is often the case that actors’ data needs are not met within the vulnerability and resilience space (that is, data for the indicators, geographic locations, time series, disaggregation and so on they demand does not exist).⁴⁷ For example, an interviewee explained that even though UBOS does produce some information about persons with disabilities,⁴⁸ the Bureau does not routinely produce data that helps practitioners understand how poverty affects persons with disabilities.

The pool of data that actors in the space are prepared to pick from is limited, as they are hesitant to use data that is not produced by UBOS, and therefore are unprepared to look elsewhere to source the data they need. This compounds data needs not being met. Interviewees explain that this attitude is rooted in a belief that using other data can “create issues” for them. For example, the reliability of their analysis, and the validity of their conclusions being questioned.

As discussed previously it is very rare that data producers, including UBOS or the MoGLSD, make the microdata they collect publicly available. When microdata is not available, it severely curtails what insight users can make. However, the unavailability of microdata is only one-half of the problem. This is because managing and analysing it requires a specialised skillset, in addition to time and resources (e.g., finance, ICT hardware and software, etc.), which are not in abundance in Uganda. It is often therefore

the case that potential users do not possess one or more of these variables, and therefore cannot fully use the microdata even when it is available to them.

Metadata

The difficulty the study team had accessing systems' metadata is symptomatic of the absence of readily accessible metadata in the country. Complete and available metadata allows potential data users to a) more easily identify information that is useful for them, and b) understand the context surrounding datasets, which can influence how they conduct their analyses. Data systems which publish datasets along with 'complete metadata' are virtually non-existent.⁴⁹ However, metadata for some UBOS surveys is published by third party partners who also store the data, such as The DHS Program with the Demographic Health Survey.

Part 3 – The foundations of Uganda’s vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem

Governance and management

3.1 Stakeholder coordination

There are instances when actors have worked together to produce desirable results in Uganda. For example, the case of the NSR shows what is possible when stakeholders willingly coordinate with each other, as joined-up working led to the implementation of a much-needed tool (which looks set to be enhanced to fill a significant gap in the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem). Moreover, interviewees explained how actors from government and donor communities come together in times of crisis, such as when there is a natural disaster, in the form of committees, to work on data-related issues.

However, these instances are embedded in a data ecosystem that is more often characterised by a disconnection. For example, UBOS is mandated with coordinating official data collection across the whole government, but interviewees state that it has struggled to bring other agencies into the NSS, with some interviewees arguing that the Bureau has inadvertently created barriers that prevent other organisations from being amalgamated into the NSS.

"Auditing, quality assurance, etc. are good but should come when you already have people on board, not imposed as a criterion for participation in the NSS. These conditions actually cause a roadblock for the participation of Ministries, Departments and Agencies, and other non-state actors. You can push for more participation but when you are also putting in place terms and conditions that are not very welcome it does not help."

Key informant interviewee

Furthermore, while UBOS is mandated with coordinating data production it is less clear which organisation is responsible for coordinating data management, and the resulting void means that it is largely unattended to.⁵⁰ The absence of government-wide data management causes issues, including:

“The principal statistician in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) said they did not have the data [we requested] and referred us to UBOS, but UBOS referred us back to the MAAIF.”

Key informant interviewee

At the same time, donor work on data in the vulnerability and resilience space is generally not harmonised. Interviewees explained that this is for several reasons including individual donors shirking cooperation as they try to gatekeep the areas of work they prioritise; donor outlooks being focused on the narrow interests of their countries' governments; and a need for their data collection activities to produce evidence which reflects favourably on their activities and programmes.

3.2 Financing

The study team identified two prominent issues with financing that damage the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem in Uganda:

1. There is not enough funding, especially at the subnational level.
2. Funding primarily comes from donors, not the government.

Interviewees explained that budgets committed towards data-related activities are too small. In addition, offices rarely receive the full amounts originally committed to. These funding gaps cause big challenges in data collection and data management, and affect UBOS and other organisations, such as the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC). A lack of funding causes shortfalls in human resources (that is, in staff and skills shortages) and core infrastructure (for example, ICT hardware and internet connection) and restricts activities (for example, the EOC has had to limit data collection activities to 16 of Uganda's 136 districts).⁵¹ These issues are amplified at the subnational level, where it is often the case that local governments do not allocate any portion of their budgets specifically towards data-related activities.⁵²

However, in spite of funding shortfalls, and the problems they cause, activities are still duplicated. For example, there are 10 dashboards related to HIV/AIDS in, and seven dashboards related to medical supply chains in operation in Uganda.⁵³ A great deal of this lack of harmonisation is rooted in donors funding siloed vertical programmes. The consequence is that the small pool of resources available covers even less than it could do if financing was better coordinated.⁵⁴

The other issue is that too small a proportion of the government's data-related activities is funded by the government. Interviewees stressed that “even UBOS largely relies on donor money”. The same situation is found at the subnational level. The two main consequences of this are that 1) national interests are compromised as donors have a powerful say in what work is done; and 2) sustainability is undermined as donor funding

cycles are relatively short-term and can be susceptible to change (for example, the specificities of thematic interests and geographic prioritisations, etc.).

3.3 Policy

Interviewees identified a number of policy documents that are relevant to the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem. For example, the Third Plan for National Statistical Development (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25)⁵⁵ (PNSD), the Ministry of Health Strategic Plan (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25)⁵⁶ (HSP), and other various sectoral plans. These documents do all contain some policies of interest. For example, objectives in the PNSD include “institutionalising coordination and management of statistics”, and “strengthen[ing] human capital development for statistics across the national statistical system”. Both of these issues are discussed in this report and are areas that need to be worked on.

However, these policies relate to the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem in a fairly tenuous way. Through desk research, the study team identified policies that are inextricably linked. For example, those contained in the NSPP, such as:

- To establish an effective monitoring and evaluation system for social protection.
- To strengthen the functionality of the civil registration system.
- To develop management information systems for different components of social protection.

The NAP includes policies such as:⁵⁷

- To equip women with timely and relevant information to enable them to advocate for and participate in prevention and mitigation of human-made and natural disasters.
- To establish appropriate coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the NAP at different levels for networking, sharing of information and effective synergies.
- To strengthen the capacity of women on early warning systems for climate-related natural disasters.
- To strengthen women’s capacity to prevent, prepare for, and recover from natural hazards by ensuring early warning data is up to date, reflects women’s and men’s gender roles and is disseminated.

The inclusion of policies in the NSPP and the NAP that aim to strengthen the vulnerability and resilience data ecosystem is very encouraging. It shows key stakeholders recognise the importance that data has in creating solutions in this space. What’s more, the policy documents are good quality. They provide clear targeting, delegate roles and responsibilities, include costings (the NAP more thoroughly than the NSPP), and sections on monitoring and evaluation, to track progress being made towards objectives (again, the NAP more thoroughly than the NSPP). Additionally, the success of the NSR is proof that policy can lead to real-world results.

Nonetheless, the main critical point about the NAP and NSPP remains; none of the interviewees we talked to – including employees from the EOC, Prime Minister’s Office

and FCDO – knew about them (or other similar plans or policies). Furthermore, interviewees did not display a particularly thorough understanding of those they did know about. For example, questions about the PNSD and HSP solicited answers, such as,

“We all know these policies demand data collection, and [aim] to create [MISs] that can be used to collect data, to ensure that vulnerable persons are catered for.”

Key informant interviewee

In short, there was very little knowledge about what the policies aimed to achieve specifically, or on the proposals about how they will be achieved. The crux of the matter here is, if practitioners do not know about them then a) achieving them will be difficult (especially those that require multi-stakeholder cooperation), and b) holding the government to account on whether they are being achieved will be exceptionally challenging. How can you hold the government to account, if you do not know what it has committed to?

Part 4 – Recommendations

This section outlines top-level policy recommendations based on the findings detailed in Parts 1–3.

4.1 Data sources and systems

There is a need for stakeholders including UBOS, ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), and other actors producing data on vulnerability and resilience to work towards addressing key bottlenecks associated with the availability and access to datasets they generate. Our specific recommendations for achieving this are as follows:

Publish anonymised microdata from various public data sources and systems to resolve challenges with access to data.⁵⁸

1. Consider formalising the processes and modalities for data access and sharing of official and public data leveraging existing policies, guidelines, and protocols for data sharing.
2. Agree memorandums of understanding between MDAs, CSOs and private actors as a critical first step in improving data sharing and addressing the challenges of using ‘private connections’ to access public data from key official sources. Such memorandums of understanding would have clauses safeguarding personal identity as well as vulnerable communities.
3. All producers of official and non-official data, including UBOS, should consider creating greater awareness of the existence of the official/public data in their custody. This could be supported by other stakeholders including donors, CSOs and private sector actors.

Increase data producers’ willingness to share data by addressing bottlenecks in accessing and data sharing. This could be achieved through the following means:

1. Nurture and promote the culture of collaboration and openness among data producers to build trust between organisations, especially where there is competition or rivalry between them. UBOS should consider leveraging its mandate and position to better coordinate the production and sharing of official data by MDAs ensuring the use of the existing framework for National Statistical Indicators to standardise data production.
2. Streamline policy for sharing official public data in all government MDAs. This would address the current MDAs practice of selling data without a clear business case, and

seeing their data as a source of revenue. The data they produce is funded through public finance and therefore it is not appropriate for them to sell it to the public.

3. Build capacity for robust cybersecurity within MDAs and all data producers to address fears of data breaches or cyberattacks that are associated with open data systems.
4. Institute clear policies and procedures, and regulatory frameworks (or increase awareness where they exist) for sharing data responsibly to address concerns about violating privacy regulations and/or exposing sensitive information.
5. Invest in technological infrastructure including hardware and software for data sharing. An example could be centralized data management systems that promote effective and secure data sharing.

4.2 Data use

Any investment made in data production and in the development of data infrastructure can only be justified when the data produced is put to its intended use. Unfortunately, the use of available data within the vulnerability and resilience space in Uganda remains weak. Our recommendations for improving the use of available vulnerability and resilience data are as follows:

Address the culture of poor data use in many government and non-government organisations. This could be achieved by:

1. Institute a policy requirement for the use of evidence for policymaking, design and administration of public services, monitoring of programmes, and advocacy work. This would help to change the current way of working in isolation motivated by priorities not backed by evidence. It could also lead to increased adoption of data use for decision-making.
2. Promote awareness of existing data sources and systems by all data producers. This would remove the widespread belief by actors that useful data is not available.
3. Improve the quality of collected data by ensuring data meets the minimum quality thresholds for indicators covering disaggregation, timeliness of publication, and frequency of collection. This would help address users' scepticism about the accuracy of the data in the vulnerability and resilience space.
4. Encourage the use of data by those closest to its source. The more the data is used, the greater the incentive to improve its quality.
5. UBOS and other data producers should create a simple, straightforward process for MDAs, CSOs and other data producers to follow to make their data official. This would help address data users' concerns about the reliability of non-official data sources. UBOS presently has a framework under its professional services department. This needs to be simplified and popularised to create awareness and demand.
6. Build capacity for data use by advocating for greater investment in skills development for managing and analysing data. Investment in ICT hardware and software is also needed.

4.3 Data governance and management

Data governance and management deficits within Uganda's vulnerability and resilience space is a key challenge that affects other facets of the data ecosystem. We offer the following recommendations to address challenges of data governance and management.

Improve the functioning of stakeholder coordination. This can be achieved by:

1. UBOS should consider leveraging its mandate and position as a coordinator of official data collection across the government to create a functional coordination platform with mechanisms for bringing together all MDAs into the NSS.
2. UBOS should consider addressing the artificial barriers including upfront requirements for data producers to adhere to specific terms and conditions for quality assurance and data audit which impede the participation in the NSS. While these conditions are important, they should not be imposed as an illegibility criterion for participation in the NSS. Instead, they could be applied once actors are already actively engaged in the NSS.
3. UBOS could also consider learning from some of the existing success stories such as the development of the NSR under the leadership of MoLGSD where effective coordination among MDAs, donors and CSOs led to the production of desirable results and outcomes for social protection data.
4. Develop a clear policy on coordinating data management. The present NSS policy seems to only mandate UBOS with coordinating data production. This leaves data management largely unattended to and results in disharmony within MDAs in managing public data.
5. The National Information Technology Authority of Uganda coordinates, promotes and monitors information technology developments in Uganda could help harmonise public data management within MDAs whose systems are already connected to its infrastructure.⁵⁹
6. Donors in the vulnerability and resilience space equally need to harmonise their work by putting aside their differences and narrow interests of their countries' governments. They should instead focus on the greater goal of advancing the use of data and evidence in decision-making. Some platforms for donor coordination already exist – these could be leveraged to address coordination gaps with donors and reduce the duplication of efforts.

Improve financing of vulnerability and resilience data. This could be achieved by:

1. The Government of Uganda should address the chronic inadequate funding allocations to entities such as UBOS, EOC and subnational administrative units. This would require allocating sufficient funding for human resources and technical capacities and funding for data-related programmes and activities at various levels.
2. The Government of Uganda should also reduce its heavy reliance on donors as primary funders of vulnerability and resilience data production by including vulnerability and resilience data in its short- and medium-term funding priorities.

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3. The Government of Uganda should encourage donors to harmonise their activities. It should keep a central record of duplications and gaps so that donors can be directed to where the needs are greatest.

Notes

- ¹ “During the first six months of 2021 the poverty rate in Uganda stood at 28%, increasing from the pre-pandemic poverty level of 18%.” The Borgen Project, 2022. The Impact of Covid-19 on poverty in Uganda. Available at: <https://borgenproject.org/impact-of-covid-19-on-poverty-in-uganda/#:~:text=The%20Economic%20Impact%20of%20COVID%2D19%20in%20Uganda&text=Furthermore%2C%20the%20Ugandan%20Finance%20Ministry,pandemic%20poverty%20level%20of%2018%25>
- ² Attendees included: the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and Makerere University.
- ³ Two additional KIIs were conducted after this time period, one in May 2023 and another in June 2023.
- ⁴ For the complete data inventory, see the download available at: <https://devinit.org/resources/ugandas-social-protection-data-ecosystem>.
- ⁵ UNDRR. Vulnerability. Available at: <http://www.undrr.org/quick/11977>. Accessed 24 April 2024.
- ⁶ Preventionweb. Understanding disaster risk. Available at: <https://www.preventionweb.net/understanding-disaster-risk/component-risk/vulnerability>. Accessed 24 April 2024.
- ⁷ UNICEF. Resilience, humanitarian assistance and social protection for children. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/eca/reports/resilience-humanitarian-assistance-and-social-protection-children-europe-and-central-asia>.
- ⁸ Two reasons for the distinction are 1) the study team could not calculate how many datasets data systems have produced over the last decade because it could not access them, and 2) stating that data systems that continually or frequently collect data produce single datasets could be misleading, as it implies a continuity in data fields, collection methods, samples, etc. that cannot be assumed.
- ⁹ Unique sources that collate data from administrative systems, official surveys, and censuses.
- ¹⁰ Unique systems that combine qualitative and quantitative information. The quantitative aspects of these systems are mostly based on surveys with small sample sizes, quantitative analysis of qualitative responses given in focus group discussions, etc.
- ¹¹ Calculated as ‘non-official qualitative’ and ‘non-official quantitative and qualitative’ combined.
- ¹² A measure of vulnerability and/or resilience is defined as any data about multi-dimensional poverty and marginalisation and the factors that relate to the risk of individuals or groups staying in or falling into poverty and/or staying or becoming marginalised. This definition is based on the World Bank and was refined in the inception workshop.
- ¹³ UBOS, 2018. Strategy for the Development of Gender Statistics (2018/19–2020/21). Available at: https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/04_2019Strategy_for_the_Development_of_Gender_Statistics_2018_19_-_2019_20.pdf
- ¹⁴ UBOS, 2019. National Priority Gender Equality Indicators. Available at: chrome- www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/05_2019National_Priority_Gender_Equality_Indicators_NPGEIs_2019.pdf
- ¹⁵ In the third plan: “institutionalise [the] generation and use of gender statistics”; in the first plan “Engender statistics”. UBOS, 2020. Third Plan for National Statistical Development (2020/21–2024/25). Available at: https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/08_2021THIRD_PLAN_FOR_NATIONAL_STATISTICAL_DEVELOPMENT_FY20_20_21_FY2024_25.pdf. UBOS, 2006. Plan for National Statistical Development (2006/7–2010/11). Available at: https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/03_2018PNSD_20072011.pdf
- ¹⁶ For an in-depth analysis of the disability data ecosystem in Uganda see “Uganda’s disability data landscape and the economic inclusion of persons with disabilities”. Development Initiatives, 2020. Uganda’s disability data landscape and the economic inclusion of persons with disabilities. Available at: <https://devinit.org/resources/uganda-disability-data-landscape-economic-inclusion-persons-with-disabilities/>
- ¹⁷ UNFPA, 2021. How can localization of SDGs contribute to “Leaving no one behind”? Available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=20000&nr=7307&menu=2993>

¹⁸ The small number of systems that produce data disaggregated to the most local levels (i.e., by municipality or facility) being reported here is extremely likely to be a significant underestimation. This is because the study team had significant difficulty obtaining detailed information about official administrative data systems, which tend to produce the most locally disaggregated data.

¹⁹ Frequency was calculated from a sample of 48 sources, because publication dates were not clear for a small number of datasets, and administrative data systems were also excluded.

²⁰ Hensen, B. et al, 2021. Remote data collection for public health research in a COVID-19 era: ethical implications, challenges and opportunities. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7928874/>

²¹ Hensen, B. et al, 2021. Remote data collection for public health research in a COVID-19 era: ethical implications, challenges and opportunities. Available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7928874/>

²² A large majority of the sources/systems that used technology were run by UBOS.

²³ The mode of collection labelled 'Don't know' (see Figure 6) refers to data sources/systems where the mode of collection has not been made available. Based on anecdotal and circumstantial evidence it is most likely that the majority of these data systems are based on manual face-to-face modes of collection, but the study team has not been able to confirm this.

²⁴ Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Protection, 2021. Launch of the National Single Registry for Social Protection. Available at: <https://mglsd.go.ug/launch-of-the-national-single-registry/>. Accessed 26 April 2024.

²⁵ In addition to this there are several social protection programmes that still do not have their own MISs, and officials from the MoGLSD said they need to be proactive in encouraging their establishment.

²⁶ Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, No date. The Single Registry for Social Protection. Available at: <http://154.72.196.50/>. Accessed 26 April 2024.

²⁷ Development Pathways, 2022. Uganda's National Single Registry: a foundation for a digital social protection ecosystem. Available at: <https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/ugandas-national-single-registry/#:~:text=This%20report%20about%20the%20National,registry%20within%20Uganda's%20digital%20ecosystem.>

²⁸ Initiative for Social and Economic Rights, 2023. ISER's Position on the 2023 Social Protection Budget. Available at: <https://iser-uganda.org/publication/isers-position-on-the-2023-24-social-protection-budget/>

²⁹ Watchdog Uganda, 2023. Minister Asamo: Why most elderly persons have not benefitted from SAGE program. Available at: <https://www.watchdoguganda.com/news/20230525/154184/minister-asamo-why-most-elderly-persons-have-not-benefitted-from-sage-program.html>. Accessed 26 April 2024.

³⁰ Government of Uganda, 2023. Stakeholder Engagement Plan for National Uganda Social Action Fund Project. Available at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099051223100522538/p179904041406107c0b4420f640d3ad26f6>

³¹ More or less the same organisations that developed and implemented the NSR are involved with the development and implementation of the social registry (i.e., the MoGLSD, NIRA, the Ministry of Local Government, etc.).

³² The MoGLSD told DI it plans to use the social registry to inform all social protection interventions, to open it up to other stakeholders to assist with their programming (e.g., the Ministry of Health identifying where vulnerable children who need vaccinations are), and to inform shock/crises response.

³³ As a part of the feasibility study the MoGLSD is looking to learn lessons from the paper-based social registry administered at the sub-regional level in Karamoja, which has been implemented for the last five–six years.

³⁴ As with the NSR, officials have to pursue the standardisation of classifications in the social registry as well. One classification that is of particular importance in this context is how people's names are recorded; some systems only record two names (e.g., the first and last names) despite some people having more, and other systems record people's full names. This makes identifying the same people in different systems more difficult. Interviewees told us they are in the early stages of tackling this problem.

³⁵ Before the next phase of work on the social registry can continue, the MoGLSD is waiting for funding to be approved by the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund. It fully expects approval to go through, and in the unlikely situation that it does not, there are alternatives available, from the World Food Programme, for example.

³⁶ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, the Initiative for Social and Economic Rights, and Unwanted Witness, 2021. Chased away and left to die. Available at: <https://iser-uganda.org/publication/chased-away-and-left-to-die/>

- ³⁷ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, the Initiative for Social and Economic Rights, and Unwanted Witness, 2021. Chased away and left to die. Available at: <https://iser-uganda.org/publication/chased-away-and-left-to-die/>
- ³⁸ The MoGLSD started using national ID cards as a means of accessing social protection in 2018. All other documentation that could be used to access social protection has since been phased out.
- ³⁹ Biometric Update, 2023. Uganda new ID plans reportedly stalled; 3M current cards unclaimed. Available at: <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202304/uganda-new-id-plans-reportedly-stalled-3m-current-cards-unclaimed>. Accessed 26 April 2024.
- ⁴⁰ National Identification and Registration Authority, 2019. Handbook for Birth Registration in Uganda. Available at: <https://plan-international.org/uganda/publications/handbook-for-birth-registration-in-uganda/>
- ⁴¹ National Identification and Registration Authority, 2019. Handbook for Birth Registration in Uganda. Available at: <https://plan-international.org/uganda/publications/handbook-for-birth-registration-in-uganda/>
- ⁴² Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016. National Statistical Metadata Dictionary (2nd Edition). Available at: <https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/35884321/national-statistical-meta-data-dictionary-uganda-bureau-of-statistics>
- ⁴³ Centre of Excellence for CRVS Systems, 2019. Snapshot of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics Systems of Uganda. Available at: https://crvssystemsc.ca/sites/default/files/assets/files/CRVS_Uganda_e_WEB.pdf
- ⁴⁴ Data from 2016, which is the most up-to-date source available. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018. Demographic and Health Survey 2016. Available at: <https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-FR333-DHS-Final-Reports.cfm>
- ⁴⁵ NIRA estimates that between July 2018 and June 2019 only 1% of total deaths were registered. However, this number only refers to certified death registration by NIRA, whereas the numbers from the Demographic and Health Survey relate to all types of death notification and registration. Atuhaire, L. K., Nansubuga, E., Nankinga, O., Nviiri, H. N., & Odur, B. (2022). Prevalence and determinants of death registration and certification uptake in Uganda. *PLoS one*, 17(3), e0264742. Available at: <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0264742>
- ⁴⁶ Uganda Radio Network, 2022. Biostatisticians Find Gaps in NIRA's Birth and Death data. Available at: <https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/biostatisticians-find-gaps-in-niras-birth-and-death-data>
- ⁴⁷ One interviewee raised the point that a lack of standardisation across UBOS sources also makes using the data difficult to use. They highlighted problems with data from panel surveys specifically: household IDs are different in different years, questions change, and new questions are added and older ones removed.
- ⁴⁸ In DI's experience, UBOS is a frontrunner in the East African region when it comes to disability data.
- ⁴⁹ There are multiple models which outline what can constitute 'complete metadata', including, for example, "W3C's Data Cube Vocabulary". UNSTATS, 2019. Introduction to data interoperability across the data value chain. Available at: <https://unstats.un.org/capacity-development/meetings/UNSD-DFID-SDG-Open-Data-Bangladesh/documents/Day-2-Interoperability.pdf>
- ⁵⁰ Interviewees believe that the Equal Opportunities Commission's (EOC) purview encompasses vulnerability, and that it has a role to play in managing vulnerability data. However, thus far it has not performed this function, and none of the interviewees were able to confirm that it is a formal function of the EOC's. DI suggests that the MoGLSD is also well positioned to lead on data management, given its centrality in delivering social protection programmes in Uganda.
- ⁵¹ Kampala is included as one district.
- ⁵² As a result of the Strengthening Sub-National Data Ecosystems Project, Kayunga district is including a budget line on data for the first time, in its 2023–24 budget.
- ⁵³ Ministry of Health, No Date. Dashboards. Available at: <https://dashboards.health.go.ug/search/>. Accessed 26 April 2024.
- ⁵⁴ For an in-depth analysis of disharmony and duplication in donors' work across a number of countries see the following: Development Initiatives, 2022. Data disharmony: How can donors better act on their commitments? Available at: <https://devinit.org/resources/data-disharmony-how-can-donors-better-act-on-their-commitments/>
- ⁵⁵ Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2020. Third Plan for National Statistical Development (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25). Available at: <https://www.ubos.org/third-plan-for-national-statistical-development-fy2020-21-fy2024-2025/>
- ⁵⁶ Ministry of Health, Republic of Uganda, 2020. Ministry of Health Strategic Plan (FY 2020/21–FY 2024/25). Available at: <https://www.health.go.ug/cause/ministry-of-health-strategic-plan-2020-21-2024-25/>

⁵⁷ Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, 2021. National Action Plan III On Women, Peace And Security 2021–2025. Available at: <https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/content/uganda-national-action-plan-wps-2021-2025>

⁵⁸ Anonymisation needs to take into account the protection of communities, not just the removal of personal details.

⁵⁹ One of the National Information Technology Authority of Uganda's core functions is to promote cooperation, coordination and rationalisation among users and providers of information technology at national and local levels so as to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure optimal utilisation of scarce resources. Read more at: <https://www.nita.go.ug/objectives-and-functions>.

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